

--from *The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Religion*, William J. Wainwright, ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005): 366-391.

Death and the Afterlife

1. Introduction

Death comes to all creatures, but human beings are unique in realizing that they will die. Hence, they are unique in being able to consider the possibility of life after death. Ideas of an afterlife of one sort or another have been promulgated by all manner of cultures and religions. For ancient peoples, the afterlife was a realm of vastly diminished existence populated by shades, ghostly counterparts of bodies. Ancient Indians and Egyptians before 2000 BCE postulated a judgment after death. The Greeks had Hades; the Hebrews had Sheol. Far from being a matter of wish-fulfillment, an afterlife, as pictured by ancient cultures, was not particularly desirable, just inevitable. (Hick, pp. 55-60)

There are many conceptions of an afterlife. To say that there is an afterlife (of any kind) is to say that biological death is not the permanent end of a human being's existence: At least some people continue to exist and to have experiences after death. The idea of reincarnation is shared by a number of religions—including Hindu, Jaina, Buddhist. According to the idea of reincarnation, one is born over and over, and the circumstances of one's life—even what sort of being one is—depend on one's actions in the preceding life. Among philosophers, Plato had a view of reincarnation. Plato developed the idea of the immortality of the soul in the *Phaedo*: According to Plato, a person is an immaterial soul, temporarily imprisoned by a body. Death is liberation from the prison of the body; but after an interval of disembodied existence, the soul is again imprisoned and is born again into this world. On Plato's view, all this occurs in the natural course of things.

1a. Christian Doctrine

All the great monotheistic religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—recognize doctrines of an afterlife. I shall focus on doctrines of resurrection of the dead, and in

particular on Christian doctrines. Christian doctrines have two sources. The first source is Second-Temple Judaism, which contributed the idea of resurrection of the body. (The New Testament mentions that the Pharisees believed in bodily resurrection, but that the Sadducees did not believe in an afterlife. Jesus endorsed the former, which was fixed as Christian doctrine by his own bodily resurrection.) The second source was Greek philosophy, which contributed the idea of the immortality of the soul. (Cullman)

To the early Church Fathers, belief in the immortality of the soul was connected with belief in resurrection of the body. The belief that Jesus rose from the dead was the belief that his soul survived death of the body and was “reinvested with his risen body.” (Wolfson, p.8) The belief in a general resurrection was the belief that surviving souls, at the end of time, would be “reinvested” with risen bodies. During the interval between death and the general resurrection, a soul would have a life without a body, but a person’s final state would be embodied in some sense. In this general picture, belief in resurrection includes belief in immortal souls and belief in postmortem bodies (of some sort).

The Christian doctrine of an afterlife is pieced together out of hints and metaphors in Scripture. Jesus’s resurrection is the paradigm case. According to Christian doctrine, Jesus was the Son of God, who was crucified, dead and buried. The third day he rose again from the dead and ascended into Heaven. Although Jesus’ resurrection is the ground of the Christian doctrine of resurrection, many questions are left open. Perhaps the most explicit, but still sketchy and metaphorical, account of an afterlife in the New Testament is in I Corinthians 15, with its “seed” metaphor. Our bodies are said to be sown in corruption, and raised in incorruption; sown in dishonor, raised in glory; sown in weakness, raised in power; sown a natural body, raised a “spiritual” body. But this passage is notoriously open to several interpretations. What is a ‘spiritual body’? Is it made of the same flesh-and-blood particles as the premortem body? of the same kind of particles if not exactly the same ones? of some entirely different kind of stuff? There is no unanimity.

There are two kinds of leading metaphors to guide answers to these questions: on the one hand, the seed metaphor, just mentioned (I Corinthians 15) or the metaphor of tents or garments that we take on as a covering in incorruption (II Corinthians 5); and on the other hand, the statue metaphor that Augustine preferred. According to the seed metaphor, developed by Origen, the body is dynamic and always in flux. Just as the body is transformed in life, so too it is transformed in death. The resurrected body will be radically changed, and will not be made of the same material as the premortem body. (Bynum, pp. 63ff) Augustine, by contrast, insisted on the reanimation of the same bodily material, which would be reassembled from dust and previous bones (Bynum, p. 95). Thomas Aquinas rejected both metaphors for understanding the nature of the body that is to be resurrected. His concern was more with the integrity of the body than with the identity of material particles. The resurrected body will contain the same fragments and organs, if not the identical particles. (Bynum, p. 265) However, Aquinas sometimes suggested that there would be material continuity of the body in the resurrection.

The various Christian views of resurrection have at least these characteristics in common: First, **embodiment**: resurrection requires some kind of bodily life after death. Postmortem bodies are different from premortem bodies in that they are said to be spiritual, incorruptible, glorified. Even if there is an “intermediate state” between death and a general resurrection, in which the soul exists unembodied, those who live after death will ultimately be embodied, according to Christian doctrine. Second, **identity**: the very same person who exists on earth is to exist in an afterlife. Individuals exist after death, not in some undifferentiated state merged with the universe, or with an Eternal Mind, or anything else. Not only is there to be individual existence in the Resurrection, but the very same individuals are to exist both now and after death. “Survival” in some weaker sense of, say, psychological similarity is not enough. The relation between a person here and now and a person in an afterlife must be identity. Third, **miracle**: Life after death, according to Christian doctrine, is a gift from God. Christian doctrine thus contrasts with the Greek idea of immortality as a natural property of the soul. The idea of miracle is built into the Christian doctrine of life after death from the beginning.

There are many questions to be answered about the doctrine of resurrection. E.g., Is there immediate resurrection at the instant of death, or is there a temporary mode of existence (an intermediate state) before a general resurrection at the end of time. (JW Cooper, 1989). There is no general agreement. But whatever the details of the conception of an afterlife, a particular *philosophical* question arises: In virtue of what is a person in an afterlife identical to a certain person in a premortem state? A similar question arises for traditions of reincarnation: In virtue of what is a person of one generation the same person as a person who lived previously? The philosophical issue in any conception of an individual afterlife is the question of personal identity. To have life after death is to have post-mortem experiences linked to each other and to premortem experiences in a way that preserves personal identity. (Price, p. 369)

1b. The Problem of Personal Identity

There are at least two philosophical problems of personal identity. The synchronic problem is solved by answering this question: In virtue of what is something a person, at some given time? The diachronic problem is solved by answering this question: In virtue of what is a person at one time identical to a person at another time? The problem of personal identity as it is raised by the idea of an afterlife is a diachronic problem: Under what conditions are persons at t_1 and at t_2 the same person? People change dramatically over time physically and mentally. A woman of 50 is very unlike a girl of 10 physically, even if the woman of 50 is the same person who, 40 years earlier, had been the girl of 10. They do not even have any matter in common. A girl of 10 has different memories, attitudes, personality from a woman of 50—even if the woman of 50 is the same person, considered 40 years later, as the girl of 10. In virtue of what is the woman of 50 identical to the girl of 10 considered 40 years later?

The needed criterion of personal identity is not epistemological. It does not say how an observer can tell that the woman of 50 is the girl at 10 considered 40 years later. Rather the criterion of personal identity is metaphysical. It says what makes it the case that the woman of 50 is the same person as the girl of 10, whether anyone recognizes the identity or not.

This question of a criterion of personal identity extends to the conception of an afterlife. The question—How is survival of bodily death even possible?—requires a theory of personal identity. In virtue of what is a person in an afterlife (in heaven, purgatory, or hell, say) the same person as a person who lived a certain life at a certain time on earth and died in bed at the age of 90, say? We can divide potential answers to this question into categories, according to what they take personal identity to depend on: an immaterial substance (like a soul); a physical substance (like a human body or brain); a composite of an immaterial substance and a physical substance; or some kind of mental or psychological continuity (like memory). In addition, my own view is that personal identity depends on a mental property—an essential property in virtue of which a person is a person (having a first-person perspective) and in virtue of which a person is the person she is (having that very first-person perspective). Although to be a person is to be an entity with mental properties essentially, on my view, sameness of person does not require mental continuity over time.

2. Exposition

Four traditional positions on personal identity yield four views on the resurrection. In virtue of what is a postmortem person the same premortem person who walked the earth? The four answers are that the premortem person and the postmortem person (i) have the same soul, or (ii) are the same soul-body composite, or (iii) have the same body, or (iv) are connected by memory.

2a. Sameness of Soul

The idea of an incorporeal soul is the idea of a nonphysical part of a human being, a nonphysical part that thinks and wills. The early Christian Church considered three theories of the soul: (1) Souls as custom-made: God creates especially for each new child a new soul at birth. (creationalism) (2) Souls as ready-made: God has a stock of souls from eternity and allocates them as needed (pre-existentialism); (3) Souls as second-hand: God created only one soul (the soul of Adam), which is passed down to his descendants (traducianism). All the traditional theories of the soul (custom-made; ready-made; traducian) describe the soul as being in a body as in a garment, or as in a temple,

or as in a house. That is, they all allow that souls can exist apart from bodies. (Wolfson, pp. 21-2) Even Thomas Aquinas, who rejects these metaphors, takes the soul to be capable of the vision of God in a (temporary) disembodied state. (Bynum, p. 266)

These theories of the soul allow for a conception of an afterlife as populated with incorporeal souls. Experience without a biological organism has seemed to many to be conceivable. One might have visual, auditory, olfactory, sensual images—images of bodies, including one’s own. The images would be mental images, acquired in ante-mortem life, and the post-mortem person’s experiences would be like dreams. The images would be governed by peculiar causal laws—psychological, not physical. E.g., a “wish to go to Oxford might be immediately followed by the occurrence of a vivid and detailed set of Oxford-like images; even though, at the moment before, one’s images had resembled Piccadilly Circus or the palace of the Dalai Lama in Tibet.” (Price, p. 370) These images would constitute a world—“the next world”—where everything still had shape, color, size, etc., but had different causal properties.

The postmortem world, although similar to a dream world, need not be solipsistic. One postmortem person could have a telepathic apparition of another person, who “announces himself” in a way that recognizably similar on different occasions. Thus, an image-world need not be altogether private. It “would be the joint product of a group of telepathetically interacting minds and public to all of them.” (Price, p.373, p. 377) There may be various post-mortem image-worlds in which people communicate telepathically with each other.

The image-worlds would be constructed from a person’s desires and memories and telepathic interactions. The postmortem worlds are “wish-fulfillment” worlds, but of one’s genuine wishes. If repression is a biological phenomenon, then repressed desires and memories would be revealed. In that case, in the next world, one’s mental conflicts would be out in the open, and the fulfillment of one’s wishes may be horrifying. One’s guilt-feelings may produce images of punishments, which would be a kind of appropriate purgatory for each person. The kind of world one would experience after death would depend on the kind of person that one was.

Where, one may wonder, is this “next world”? The question of its spatial relation to the physical world has no meaning. The images that make up next world are in a space of their own, but—like dream images—they bear no spatial relations to our world. If you dream of a tree, its branches are spatially related to its trunk; you can ask, how tall is the dreamed-of tree, but not how far is it from the mattress. (Price, p. 373) “Passing” from this world to the next is not a physical passage. It is more like passing from waking experience to dreaming.

Richard Swinburne has developed a contemporary view of the soul as the immaterial seat of mental life, or conscious experience. Mental events like believings, desirings, purposings, sensing, though not themselves brain events, interact with brain events. Although Swinburne believes in evolution in biology, and sometimes speaks of souls as having evolved (Swinburne, p. 182), the evolution of souls requires God’s hand. On Swinburne’s view, the human soul does not develop naturally from genetic material, but each soul is created by God and linked to the body. (Swinburne, p. 199)

Although souls are in this world linked to brains, there is no contradiction, according to Swinburne, in the soul’s continuing to exist without a body. Indeed, the soul is the necessary core of a person which must continue if a person is to continue. (Swinburne, p. 146) Since, on Swinburne’s view, no natural laws govern what happens to souls after death, there would be no violation of natural law if God were to give to souls life after death, with or without a new body. Swinburne solves the problem of personal identity for this world and the next by appeal to immaterial souls.

Recently, scientific philosophers have suggested materialistic conceptions of the soul. For example, the soul is software to the hardware of the brain; if persons are identified with souls (software), they can be “re-embodied, perhaps in a quite different medium.” (MacKay, p. 724-5) Another materialistic view of the soul conceives of the soul as an “information-bearing pattern, carried at any instant by the matter of my animated body.” At death, God will remember the patterns and “its instantiation will be recreated by him” when at the resurrection. (Polkinghorne, p. 163)

2b. Sameness of soul-body composite

Thomas Aquinas took over Aristotle's framework for understanding human beings, modifying it as little as possible to accommodate Christian doctrine. On Aristotle's view, all living things had souls—plants had nutritive souls, nonhuman animals had sensitive souls, and human animals (“men”) had rational souls. The soul was not separable from the body. A human being was a substance: formed matter. The body supplied the matter, the soul the form. No more could a rational soul exist apart from the body whose form it was than could the shape of a particular ax exist apart from that ax. The soul is the form of the body. So, Aristotle had no place for an afterlife.

Following Aristotle, Aquinas agreed that the soul is the form of the body, but—building on Aristotle's concession that the “agent intellect” is separable (De Anima 3.5, 430a17)—Aquinas held that the soul is a substantial form that could “subsist” on its own. Aquinas assumed that there is a general resurrection at the end of time, before which those who have died are in an “intermediate state.” The human being—the substance, the individual—does not exist as such during the intermediate state. What continues through the intermediate state is only the rational soul which “subsists” until reunited with the body, at which time the human being is fully recovered. The disembodied soul can neither sense nor feel; it is only the part of the person that thinks and wills. While the soul is disembodied, the soul is *not* the person who died. It is merely a remnant of the person, awaiting reunion with the person's body. It is only when the soul is reunited with the person's body (the same one) that the person resumes life.

So Aquinas's view of a human person is rather of a composite of body and soul. He does not equate personal identity over time with identity of soul. However, Aquinas's conception of the afterlife does require separability of souls from bodies—albeit temporary—and continued existence of souls after death. So, it is reasonable to include Aquinas's view both with the theories of survival of souls and with the theories of bodily resurrection.

2c. Sameness of Body

The Christian doctrine of resurrection of the body suggests that personal identity, at least in part, consists of bodily identity. If personal identity consists in bodily identity,

even in part, then reincarnation is ruled out, as is Price's conception of an afterlife. Reincarnation requires that the same person have different bodies, and Price's conception of an afterlife was of a disembodied consciousness.

For millenia 'resurrection of the body' has been taken to mean that the very same body that died would come back to life. Although I Corinthians 15 plainly asserts that the resurrected body is an incorruptible "spiritual" (or "glorified") body, the spiritual body was to be reconstituted from the dust and bones of the original pre-mortem body. The body may undergo radical change, but it is to persist in its post-mortem state as the same body. The earliest Christians supposed the body to be the person; later Christians (like Aquinas) took the body to be an essential part of the person, along with the soul. Either way—whether personal identity is bodily identity or personal identity just entails bodily identity—if a person is to be resurrected, the person's body—the same body—must exist in the afterlife.

There are at least two ways that this story may be filled out, depending on how the idea of 'same body' is taken. The first way of understanding 'same body,' shared by most of the Church fathers, is in terms of same constituent particles. Suppose that Jane is to be resurrected. At the general resurrection, God finds the particles that had composed Jane's body, say, and reassembles them exactly as they had been before Jane's death, thereby restoring Jane's body. If personal identity is bodily identity, then God thereby restores Jane, i.e., brings her back to life. The same body, in both its pre-mortem and post-mortem phases, has the same particles.

The second way of understanding 'same body' appeals to a natural way to understand identity of human bodies over time. Unlike inanimate objects, human bodies undergo a complete change of cells every few years. Not a single one of Sam's cells today was one of his cells ten years ago; yet Sam has not changed bodies. So, perhaps identity of body should not consist of identity of constituent cells, or even of identity of some small percentage of constituent cells. The natural thing to say is that identity of body consists of spatiotemporal continuity of ever-changing constituent cells. Perhaps in the resurrection God slowly replaces the atoms that had composed Jane's organic cells by

glorified and incorruptible elements, and He carries out the replacement in a way that preserves spatiotemporal continuity of the body. If that is possible, and if identity of bodies consists in spatiotemporal continuity, then a premortem body could be the same body as a postmortem body even though the premortem body is corruptible and the postmortem body is incorruptible.

2d. The Memory Criterion

The memory criterion is that sameness of person is determined by psychological continuity, not by continuity of substance, material or immaterial. The originator of the memory criterion was John Locke, who was explicitly motivated in part by a desire to make sense of the idea of resurrection. Locke took identity of a person over time to be identity of consciousness over time—regardless of identity of substance. (Locke, II, xxvii, 1924) Locke's idea allows for the possibility that a single consciousness could unite several substances into a single person and for the possibility that a single consciousness could even exist over temporal gaps. Such an approach is clearly congenial to the idea of resurrection.

Suppose that we say that A and B are the same person if and only if A can remember what B did, or B can remember what A did. What it means to say that A can remember what B did is that what B did caused, in the right way, A's memory of what B did. What secures sameness of person are causal connections of a certain sort among mental states. It is difficult to spell out just the right kind of causal connection, but 'of a certain sort' is supposed to rule out cases like the one where B cuts the grass and tells C what she had done; then B gets amnesia, and C reports back to B that B had cut the grass. C's telling B that B had cut the grass causes B to have a mental state of thinking that she had cut the grass, and B's apparent memory of cutting the grass is ultimately caused by B's having cut the grass. But B's apparent memory is not a real memory, because B's mental state of thinking that she had cut the grass was caused by her cutting the grass, but it was not caused in the right way. The causal chain between B's cutting the grass and her apparent memory went through C. B would not have had the apparent memory of cutting the grass if C had not told B that she had cut the grass.

So, it seems that we have a criterion for sameness of resurrected person and earthly person that does not require sameness of body or sameness of soul: If a resurrected person has Jones's memories—i.e., mental states of what Jones did, caused in the right way—then that resurrected person is Jones.

3. Criticism

All the traditional views of personal identity just canvassed have been targets of criticism. Some of the criticisms that follow are well-known; others, as far as I know, are novel.

3a. Sameness of soul

There are familiar arguments in the secular literature—from the 17th century on—about the problem of understanding how immaterial minds can interact with material bodies. These arguments apply equally to the conception of the soul as an immaterial substance that can exist unembodied.

Another important criticism of the idea of a disembodied soul, however, concerns the question of individuating souls at a time—the synchronic problem. In virtue of what are there one souls or two? If souls are embodied, the bodies individuate. There is one soul per body. But if souls are separated from bodies—existing on their own, apart from bodies—then there is apparently no difference between there being one soul with some thoughts and two souls with half as many thoughts. If there is no difference between there being one soul and two, then there are no souls. So, it seems that the concept of a soul is incoherent.

As we saw in 2b, Aquinas has a response to this problem of distinguishing between one and two unembodied immaterial souls at a single time. Each separated soul had an affinity to the body with which it had been united in pre-mortem life. Even when Smith's soul is disembodied, what makes Smith's soul *Smith's* soul—and not Brown's soul, say—is that Smith's soul has a tendency and potential to be reunited with Smith's body, and not with Brown's body. [But see 4b.] This reply is not available to proponents

of immaterial souls—like Plato or Descartes—who take a human person to be identical to a soul.

Even if we could individuate souls at a time, and thus at a single time distinguish one soul from two souls, there would still be a problem of individuating a soul over time—the diachronic problem. To see this, consider: Either souls are subject to change or they are not. Suppose first that souls are not subject to change. In that case, they cannot be the locus of religious life. Religious life consists in part of phenomena like religious conversion and “amendment of life.” If souls are immune to change, they can hardly participate in religious conversion or amendment of life. Souls must be subject to change if they are to play their roles in religious life.

So, suppose that souls are subject to change. In that case, the same difficulty that arises for the identity of a person over time also arises for the identity of a soul over time. Just as we asked, *In virtue of what is person1 at t1 the same person as person2 at t2?* we can ask, *In virtue of what is disembodied soul1 at t1 the same soul as disembodied soul2 at t2?* Consider Augustine before and after his conversion—at t1 and t2 respectively. In virtue of what was the soul at t1 the same soul as the soul at t2? The only answer that I can think of is that the soul at t1 and the soul at t2 were both Augustine’s soul. But, of course, that answer is untenable inasmuch as it presupposes sameness of person over time, and sameness of person over time is what we need a criterion of sameness of soul over time to account for. So, it seems that the identity of a person over time can not be the identity of a soul over time.

The materialistic conceptions of the soul (MacKay; Polkinghorne) do not seem to fare any better. They would seem to succumb to the duplication problem that afflicts the memory criterion. (See 3c) But if The Matthews Argument (See 3d) rehabilitates the memory criterion, an analogue of that argument could save these materialistic conceptions of the soul.

3b. Sameness of Soul-Body Composite

Aquinas's contribution was to give an account of what happens between death and resurrection in terms of the subsistence of the rational soul. Aquinas's view has the advantage over the substance dualists like Plato and Descartes in that it gives a reason why resurrection should be bodily resurrection: The body is important to make a complete substance.

On the other hand, Aquinas's account buys these advantages at a cost. His account commits him to a new ontological category of being: the rational souls as a subsisting entity that is not a substance. It is not really an individual, but a kind of individual-manque. We can say very little about this new kind of entity except that it fills the bill. It would be desirable to make sense of a Christian doctrine of resurrection without appealing to a new and strange kind of entity, and in section 4, there will be an attempt to do so.

More important, however, is a problem internal to Aquinas's thought. There is a tension in Aquinas, with respect to ontological priority, between his conception of the human being as a composite of soul (form) and body (matter), and his conception of the soul as itself a substantial form that accounts for the identity of a human being through an unembodied period. On the one hand, Aquinas says that the soul without a body is only a fragment, not a human being. So, the human being seems to have ontological priority. On the other hand, he says that the soul is a substantial form that carries our identity and can enjoy the beatific vision on its own; the body is just an expression of its glory. So, the soul alone seems to have ontological priority. The tension arises between whether the human being (the body/soul composite, either part of which is incomplete without the other) or the substantial soul has ontological priority.

The reason that this tension threatens the Thomistic view is that Aquinas holds that disembodied souls are individuated by the bodies that they long for and desire reunion with. If the soul is the substantial form that accounts for the identity of the resurrected person, and if the body is merely matter (potency) of which the soul is the form, then the body of the resurrected human being that rises—*whatever* its matter—will

be that human being's body, by definition. As Bynum put it, "God can make the body of Peter out of the dust that was once the body of Paul." (Bynum, p. 260) If this is the case, souls cannot be individuated at a time by their yearning for a certain body—because the identity of the body (whose body it is) will depend upon the identity of the soul. It is difficult to see how Aquinas can combine the Aristotelian view that matter individuates with his view that the soul is a substantial form that can "subsist"—and experience God—apart from a body.

3c. Sameness of Body

During much of Christian history, the idea of the resurrection of the body was of a literal, material resurrection. The resurrected body was considered to be the same body as the earthly body in the sense that it is composed of (at least some of) the same particles as the earthly body. At the resurrection, it was held, God will reassemble and reanimate the same particles that composed the person's earthly body, and in that way personal identity would be secured in the afterlife.

There are some well-known difficulties with taking the resurrection body to require reassembly of the premortem body. For example, in the early years of Christian martyrdom, there was concern about cannibalism: The problem becomes acute if, say, a hungry soldier eats a captive, who himself has eaten a civilian. So, the soldier's body is composed in part by the captive's, which in turn is composed of the civilian. The same cells may be parts of three earthly bodies, and there seems to be no principled way for God to decide which parts belong to which postmortem bodies. In light of God's omnipotence and omniscience, I doubt that this objection is insurmountable.

Three further difficulties, however, raise more serious logical concerns. Suppose that Jane's body was utterly destroyed, and the atoms that had composed it were spread throughout the universe. Gathering the atoms and reassembling them in their exact premortem positions relative to each other would *not* bring Jane's body back into existence. To see this, consider an analogy. Suppose that one of Augustine's manuscripts had been entirely burned up, and that later God miraculously reassembled the atoms in the manuscript. The reassembled atoms would be a perfect duplicate of the

manuscript, but they do not compose the very manuscript that had been destroyed. The reassembled atoms have their positions as a result of God's activity, not of Augustine's. The duplicate manuscript is related to the original manuscript as a duplicate tower-of-blocks is related to your child's original tower that you accidentally knocked over and then put the blocks back in their original positions. The tower that you built is not the same one that your child built; the manuscript that God produced is not the same one that Augustine produced. (van Inwagen, 1978)

The situation with respect to God's reassembling the atoms of a body that had been totally destroyed is similar to God's reassembling the atoms in Augustine's manuscript. If a corpse had not decayed too badly, God could 'start it up' again. But if the body had been cremated or had been entirely destroyed, there is no way that *it* could be reconstituted. The most that is metaphysically possible is that God could create a duplicate body out of the same atoms that had composed the original body. The same body that had been destroyed—the same person on the bodily criterion—could not exist again. Not even an omnipotent and omniscient God could bring that very body back into existence. So, the "reassembly" view cannot contribute to an account of the resurrection. Since the preceding argument depends on metaphysical intuitions about bodily identity, perhaps this second argument is not insurmountable either.

However, there is a third argument, also from van Inwagen (1978), that seems to be logically conclusive against the view that resurrection involves reassembly of a premortem person's atoms. None of the atoms that were part of me in 1960 are part of me now. Therefore, God could gather up all the atoms that were part of me in 1960 and put them in exactly the same relative positions that they had in 1960. He could do this without destroying me now. Then, in the "reassembly" view were correct, God could confront me now with myself as I was in 1960. As van Inwagen points out, each of us could truly say to the other, "I am you." But that is conceptually impossible. Therefore, the "reassembly" view is wrong.

I should point out that these considerations do not make van Inwagen a skeptic about bodily resurrection. God could accomplish bodily resurrection in some other

way—e.g., by replacing a person’s body with a duplicate right before death or cremation, and the duplicate is what is cremated or buried. This shows that it is logically possible that bodily resurrection, where the resurrected body is the same one as the premortem body, be accomplished by an omnipotent being—even if we lack the conceptual resources to see how. The present point, however, is that resurrected bodies are not produced by God’s reassembling the atoms of premortem bodies.

Putting aside van Inwagen’s arguments, the final difficulty for bodily resurrection comes from reflection on the following question: How can an earthly body that is subject to decay or destruction by fire be the same body as an incorruptible glorified body? I suggested that if identity of bodies consists of spatiotemporal continuity, and if God could replace the organic cells of a body by incorruptible and glorified cells in a way that preserved spatiotemporal continuity, then a premortem body could be the same body as a postmortem body even though the premortem body is corruptible and the postmortem body is incorruptible.

However, I doubt that one and the same body (or one and the same anything else) can be corruptible during part of its existence and incorruptible during another part of its existence. The reason for my doubt is that being corruptible and being incorruptible concern the persistence conditions of a thing, and a thing has its persistence conditions essentially. To say that a thing is corruptible is to say that there are a range of conditions under which it would go out of existence; to say that a thing is incorruptible is to say that there are no such conditions. It is logically impossible—or at least it seems so—that a single thing is such that there are conditions at one time under which it could go out of existence, and that there are no such conditions at another time under which it could go out of existence. This difficulty could be overcome by not requiring that the resurrected body (incorruptible) be the very same body as the earthly body (corruptible). [See section 4.]

3d. The Memory Criterion

Many philosophers find psychological continuity an attractive criterion of personal identity, but there are well-known, and potentially devastating, problems with it.

The major problem is called ‘the duplication problem.’ The problem is that, however ‘in the right way’ is spelled out for the causal connections between mental states of Jones now and a future person, two future persons can be related to Jones now can have mental states caused by Jones’s mental states now in the right way. It is logically possible that Jones’ memories be transferred to two future persons in exactly the same “right way” (whatever that is). In that case, the memory criterion would hold, per impossibile, that two future persons are Jones. Whatever causal connections between the mental states of Jones now and person B in the future could also hold between the mental states of Jones now and a different person C in the future. But it is logically impossible that Jones be both B and C.

To put this point another way: There is an important constraint on any criterion of personal identity. Identity is a one-one relation, and no person can be identical with two distinct future persons. So, any criterion of personal identity that can be satisfied both by person A at t1 and person B at t2 and by person A at t1 and person C at t2 entails that $B = C$. So, if B is a different person from C, a criterion that allows that A is identical to both is logically untenable. However, if sameness of memories sufficed for sameness of person, one person could become two: A’s memories could be transferred to B and C, where $B \neq C$, in such a way that B’s and C’s memories are continuous with A’s memories in exactly the same way (“the right way”). It would follow on the memory criterion that $A = B$ and $A = C$. But since $B \neq C$, this is a contradiction. Hence, the memory criterion does not work. (Williams, 1973a)

The problem of duplication seems insurmountable for the memory criterion. Philosophers have responded to the problem of duplication with rather desperate measures—e.g., Jones is the same person as a future person, as long as there are no duplicates. If there are two future persons at t2 related to Jones at t1 in the same way, then Jones is neither. Jones just does not survive until t2; at t2, there are two replicas of Jones, but Jones herself is no longer there. But if only one future person at t2 is related to Jones at t1 in exactly that way, then—according to this response to the duplication problem—Jones is that person at t2. Thus, Jones can be made not to survive by

duplication. This sort of move seems to many a most unsatisfying way to think of personal identity,

There may be another way, at least if we allow religious assumptions, to salvage the memory criterion. A religious philosopher may respond to the duplication argument by saying that God would not bring it about (or let it be brought about) that both B and C have A's memories. Thus, God in His goodness, would prevent duplication (Locke, 1924, II, xxvii, 13). But the memory criterion would still be vulnerable to the charge that, even if God would not allow both B and C to have A's memories, memory would not be a metaphysically sufficient criterion for personal identity. It would still be metaphysically possible for two people, B and C, to have all A's memories—that is, for each to have memories continuous with A's.

However, there is an argument using religious premises that rehabilitates the memory criterion by showing that it is metaphysically impossible for God to bring it about that B and C both have all A's memories. Since this way was suggested to me by Gareth B. Matthews, call it 'The Matthews Argument.' The premises of this argument are explicitly religious. They appeal to God's necessary attributes—viz., that God is essentially just—and to the notion of a judgment after death. If God is essentially just and God judges everyone, and A is a person who deserves punishment, then it would be metaphysically impossible for B and C to have A's memories.

The reason that it would be metaphysically impossible for B and C to have A's memories is this: A deserves punishment. God is essentially just and judges everyone. Suppose that B and C both had A's memories (caused in the right way). Whom does God punish? If God punished B but not C, or C but not B, then God would not be essentially just: B and C are related to A in exactly the same way; it is impossible to be just and to judge B and C differently. On the other hand, if G punished both B and C, then there would be twice the punishment that A deserved, and again God would not be essentially just. Either way, supposing that B and C both had A's memories (caused in the right way), violates God's essential justice in judgment. Since God is essentially just, if A

deserves punishment, it is metaphysically impossible for God to bring it about that B and C both have A's memories.

If everyone one deserves punishment except Christ, then this argument shows that it is metaphysically impossible for God to transfer A's memories to two distinct nondivine people. It is metaphysically impossible for God to transfer Christ's memories to two distinct nondivine people since Christ is divine. The Matthews Argument relies on heavy theological assumptions; but it does rescue the memory criterion from the duplication problem.

4. Original Philosophical Development

There is yet another view of human persons, which is compatible with the doctrine of resurrection. Suppose that human persons are purely material substances—constituted by human bodies, but not identical to the bodies that constitute them. (Baker, 2000) On this view—'the Constitution View'—something is a person in virtue of having a first-person perspective, and a person is a *human* person in virtue of being constituted by a human body. (I do not distinguish between human organisms and human bodies; the body that constitutes me now is identical to a human organism.) The relation between a person and her body is the same relation that a statue bears to the piece of bronze (say) that makes it up: constitution. So, there are two theoretical ideas—the notion of constitution and the notion of a first-person perspective—that need explication. I'll discuss each of these ideas briefly. First, the first-person perspective.

4a. The First-Person Perspective

A first-person perspective is the ability to conceive of oneself as oneself. This is not just the ability to use the first-person pronoun; rather, it requires that one can *conceive of* oneself as the referent of the first-person pronoun independently of any name or description of oneself. In English, this ability is manifested in the use of a first-person pronoun embedded in a clause introduced by a psychological or linguistic verb in a first-person sentence. For example, "I wish that I were a movie star," or "I said that I would do it" or "I wonder how I'll die" all illustrate a first-person perspective. If I wonder

how I will die, or I promise that I'll stick with you, then I am thinking of myself as myself; I am not thinking of myself in any third-person way (e.g., not as LB, nor as the person who is thinking, nor as her, nor as the only person in the room) at all. Even if I had total amnesia—and didn't know my name or anything at all about my past—I could still think of yourself as yourself. Anything that can wonder how it will die ipso facto has a first-person perspective and thus is a person. In short, any being whatever with the ability to think of itself as itself—whether a divine being, an artificially manufactured being (like a computer), a human clone, a Martian, anything that has a first-person perspective—is a person.

A being may be conscious without having a first-person perspective. Nonhuman primates and other higher animals are conscious, and they have psychological states like believing, fearing and desiring. They have points of view (e.g., “danger in that direction”), but they cannot conceive of themselves as the subjects of such thoughts. They can not *conceive of* themselves from the first-person. (We have every reason to think that they do not wonder how they will die.) So, having psychological states like beliefs and desires, and having a point of view are necessary but not sufficient conditions for being a person. A sufficient condition for being a person—whether human, divine, ape, or silicon-based—is having a first-person perspective. So, what makes something a person is not the “stuff” it is made of. It does not matter whether something is made of organic material or silicon or, in the case of God, no material “stuff” at all. If a being has a first-person perspective, it is a person.

Person is an ontological kind whose defining characteristic is a capacity for a first-person perspective. A first-person perspective is the basis of all self-consciousness. It makes possible an inner life, a life of thoughts that one realizes are her own. The appearance of first-person perspectives in a world makes an ontological difference in that world: A world populated with beings with inner lives is ontologically richer than a world populated with no beings with inner lives. But what is ontologically distinctive about being a person—namely, the capacity for a first-person perspective—does not have to be secured by an immaterial substance like a soul.

4b. Constitution:

What distinguishes human persons from other logically possible persons (God, Martians, perhaps computers) is that human persons are constituted by human bodies (i.e., human animals), rather than, say, by Martian green-slime bodies.

Constitution is a very general relation that we are all familiar with (though probably not under that label). A river at any moment is constituted by an aggregate of water molecules. But the river is not identical to the aggregate of water molecules that constitutes it at that moment. Since one and the same river—call it ‘R’—is constituted by different aggregates of molecules at different times, the river is not identical to any of the aggregates of water molecules that make it up. So, assuming here the classical conception of identity, according to which if $a = b$, then necessarily, $a = b$, constitution is not identity.

Another way to see that constitution is not identity is to notice that even if an aggregate of molecules, A_1 , actually constitutes R at t_1 , R might have been constituted by a different aggregate of molecules, A_2 , at t_1 . So, constitution is a relation that is in some ways similar to identity, but is not actually identity. If the relation between a person and her body is constitution, then a person is not identical to her body. The relation is more like the relation between a statue and the piece of bronze that makes it up, or between the river and the aggregates of molecules.

The answer to the question—What most fundamentally is x ?—is what I call ‘ x ’s primary kind.’ Each thing has its primary-kind property essentially. If x constitutes y , then x and y are of different primary kinds. If x constitutes y , then what “the thing” is determined by y ’s primary-kind. For example, if a human body constitutes a person, then what there is a person-constituted-by-a human-body. So you—a person constituted by a human body—are most fundamentally a person. Person is your primary kind. If parts of your body were replaced by bionic parts until you were no longer human, you would still be a person. You are a person as long as you exist. If you ceased to have a first-person perspective, then you would cease to exist—even if your body was still there.

Whether we are talking about rivers, statues, human persons, or any other constituted thing, the basic idea is this: When certain things of certain kinds (aggregates of water molecules, pieces of marble, human organisms) are in certain circumstances (different ones for different kinds of things), then new entities of different kinds come into existence. The circumstances in which a piece of marble comes to constitute a statue have to do with an artist's intentions, the conventions of the artworld, etc. The circumstances in which a human organism comes to constitute a human person have to do with the development of a (narrowly-defined capacity for a) first-person perspective. In each case, new things of new kinds, with new sorts of causal powers, come into being. Since constitution is the vehicle, so to speak, by which things of new kinds come into existence in the natural world, it is obvious that constitution is not identity. Indeed, this conception is relentlessly anti-reductive.

Although not identity, constitution is a relation of real unity. If x constitutes y at a time, then x and y are not separate things. A person and her body have lots of properties in common: the property of having toenails, and the property of being responsible for certain of her actions. But notice: the person has the property of having toenails, only because she is constituted by something that could have had toenails even if it had constituted nothing. And her body is responsible for her actions only because it constitutes something that would have been responsible no matter what constituted it.

So, I'll say that the person has the property of having toenails derivatively, and her body has the property of being responsible for certain of her actions derivatively; the body has the property of having toenails nonderivatively, and the person has the property of being responsible for certain of her actions nonderivatively. If x constitutes y , then some of x 's properties have their source (so to speak) in y , and some of y 's properties have their source in x . The unity of the object x -constituted-by- y is shown by the fact that x and y borrow properties from each other. The idea of having properties derivatively accounts for the otherwise strange fact that if x constitutes y at t , x and y share so many properties even though $x \neq y$.

To summarize the general discussion of the idea of constitution: Constitution is a very general relation throughout the natural order. Although it is a relation of real unity,

it is short of identity. (Identity is necessary; constitution is contingent. Identity is symmetrical; constitution is asymmetrical.) Constitution is a relation that accounts for the appearance of genuinely new kinds of things with new kinds of causal powers. If F and G are primary kinds and Fs constitutes Gs, then an inventory of the contents of the world that includes Fs but leaves out Gs is incomplete. Gs are not reducible to Fs.

4c. Human Persons

A *human* person at time t is a person (i.e., a being with a first-person perspective) that is constituted a human body at t and was constituted by a human body at the beginning of her existence. I say ‘was constituted by a human body at the beginning of her existence’ to avoid problems raised by the Incarnation. The orthodox Christian view is that the eternal Second Person of the Trinity was identical with the temporal human Jesus of Nazareth, and that that Being was both fully divine and fully human. How this could be so is ultimately a mystery that requires special treatment far beyond the scope of this entry.)

According to the Constitution View, an ordinary human person is a material object in the same way that a statue or a carburetor is a material object. A statue is constituted by, say, a piece of marble; but it is not identical to the piece of marble that constitutes it. The piece of marble could exist in a world in which it was the only occupant; but no statue could. Nothing that is a statue could exist in a world without artists or institutions of art. A human person is constituted by an organism, a member of the species *Homo Sapiens*, but is not identical to the organism that constitutes her. The human organism could exist in a world in which no psychological properties whatever were exemplified; but no person could. Nothing that is a person could exist in a world without first-person perspectives. A human organism that develops a first-person perspective comes to constitute a new thing: a person.

Just as different statues are constituted by different kinds of things (pieces of marble, pieces of bronze, etc.), so too different persons are (or may be) constituted by different kinds of things (human organisms, pieces of plastic, Martian matter, or in the case of God, nothing at all). What makes something a person (no matter what it is “made

of”) is a first-person perspective; what makes something a piece of sculpture (no matter what it is “made of”) is its relation to an art world. A person could start out as a human person and have organic parts replaced by synthetic parts until she was no longer constituted by a *human* body. If the person whose organic parts were replaced by synthetic parts retained her first-person perspective—no matter what was doing the regulating—then she would still exist and still be a person, even with a synthetic body. If she ceased to be a person (i.e., ceased to have a first-person perspective), however, she would cease to exist altogether. To put it more technically, a person’s persistence conditions are determined by the property of being a person (i.e., of having a first-person perspective): A human person could cease to be organic without ceasing to exist. (She might have a resurrected body or a bionic body.) But she could not cease to be a person without ceasing to exist.

On the Constitution View, then, a human person and the animal that constitutes her differ in persistence conditions without there being any actual physical intrinsic difference between them. The persistence conditions of animals—all animals, human or not—are biological; and the persistence conditions of persons—all persons, human or not—are not biological.

4d. Resurrection on the Constitution View

The Constitution View can solve some outstanding conceptual problems about the doctrine of resurrection. The two elements of the Constitution View needed to show how resurrection is metaphysically possible are these: (1) Human persons are essentially embodied, and (2) Human persons essentially have first-person perspectives.

(1) Essential embodiment. Although human persons cannot exist without some body or other (a body that can support a first-person perspective), they can exist without the bodies that they actually have. We can speak of human persons in the resurrection, where, though still embodied, they do not have human bodies with human organs and DNA. The same persons who had been constituted by earthly bodies can come to be constituted by resurrected bodies. The bodies on earth and in heaven are not the same, but the persons are.

(2) Essential first-person perspectives. If a person's first-person perspective were extinguished, the person would go out of existence. What makes a person the individual that she is is her first-person perspective. So, what must persist in the resurrection is the person's first-person perspective—not her soul (there are no souls), and not her body (she may have a new body in the resurrection).

What is needed is a criterion for sameness of first-person perspective over time. In virtue of what does a resurrected person have the same first-person perspective as a certain earthly person who was born in 1800? Although I think that the Constitution View solves synchronic problem of identity noncircularly (Baker, 2000), I think that there is no informative noncircular answer to the question, on anyone's view: in virtue of what do person P1 at t1 and person P2 at t2 have the same first-person perspective over time? It is just a primitive, unanalyzable fact that some future person is I; but there is a fact of the matter nonetheless.

The Constitution View is compatible with the three features of the Christian doctrine of resurrection mentioned at the outset: embodiment, identity, miracle.

In the first place, the Constitution View shows why resurrection should be bodily: Human persons are essentially embodied, and hence could not exist unembodied. The first-person perspective is an essential property of a person constituted by a body of some kind. A first-person perspective cannot exist on its own, disembodied. So, the question—Why is resurrection bodily?—cannot arise. On the interpretation of the doctrine of resurrection according to which a human person exists in some intermediate state between her death and a general resurrection in the future, the Constitution View would postulate an intermediate body. (Alternatively, the Constitution View is compatible with there being a temporal gap in the person's existence). Since the Constitution View does not require that there be the same body for the same person, the problems found with the traditional theories of body are avoided.

In the second place, on the Constitution View, it is possible that a future person with a resurrected body is identical to Smith now, and there is a fact of the matter about which, if any, such future person is Smith. To see that there is a fact of the matter about

which resurrected person is Smith, we must proceed to the third feature of the doctrine of resurrection.

In the third place, resurrection is a miracle, a gift from God. The Constitution View can use this feature to show that there is a fact of the matter about which resurrected person is, say, Smith. The question is this: Which of the resurrected people is Smith? Since the Constitution View holds that Smith might have had a different body from the one that he had on earth, he may be constituted by a different (glorified) body in heaven. So, 'Smith is the person with body 1' is contingently true if true at all.

Now, according to the traditional doctrine of Providence, God has two kinds of knowledge—free knowledge and natural knowledge. God's free knowledge is knowledge of contingent truths, and his natural knowledge is knowledge of logical and metaphysical necessities. (I'm disregarding the possibility of middle knowledge here.) Again, according to the traditional doctrine of Providence, the obtaining of any contingent state of affairs depends on God's free decree. Whether the person with resurrected body 1, or body 2, or some other body is Smith is a contingent state of affairs. Therefore, which if any of these states of affairs obtains depends on God's free decree. No immaterial soul is needed for there to be a fact of the matter as to whether Smith is the person with resurrected body 1. All that is needed is God's free decree that brings about one contingent state of affairs rather than another. If God decrees that the person with body 1 have Smith's first-person perspective, then Smith is the person with body 1. (Davis, 1993, 119-121). So, there is a fact of the matter as to which, if any, of the persons in the Resurrection is Smith, even if we creatures cannot know it. On the Christian idea of Providence, it is well within God's power to bring it about that a certain resurrected person is identical to Smith.

Notice that this use of the doctrine of God's Providence provides for the metaphysical impossibility of Smith's being identical to both the person with body 1 and the person with body 2. For it is part of God's natural knowledge that it is metaphysically impossible for one person to be identical to two persons. And according to the notion of God's natural knowledge, what is metaphysically impossible is not within

God's power to bring about. So, the Constitution View excludes the duplication problem.

4e. Advantages of the Constitution View: The Constitution View can offer those who believe in immaterial souls (Immaterialists) almost everything that they want—without the burden of making sense of how there can be immaterial souls in the natural world. For example, human persons can survive change of body; truths about persons are not exhausted by truths about bodies; persons have causal powers that their bodies would not have if they did not constitute persons; there is a fact of the matter about which, if any, future person is I; persons are not identical to bodies.

The Constitution View also has advantages, at least for Christians, over its major materialistic competitor: Animalism. (Animalism is the view that a human person is identical to a human organism.) On the Constitution View, being a person is not just a contingent property of things that are fundamentally nonpersonal (animals).

On the Animalist view, our having first-person perspectives (or any mental states at all) is irrelevant to the kind of being that we are. But the Christian story cannot get off the ground without presuppositions about first-person perspectives. On the human side, without first-person perspectives, there would be no sinners and no penitents. Since a person's repentance requires that she realize that she herself has offended, nothing lacking a first-person perspective could possibly repent. On the divine side: Christ's atonement required that he suffer, and an important aspect of his suffering was his anticipation of his death (e.g., the agony in the Garden of Gethsemane); and his anticipation of his death would have been impossible without a first-person perspective. This part of Christ's mission specifically required a first-person perspective. What is important about us (and Christ) according to the Christian story is that we have first-person perspectives. Given how important the first-person perspective is to the Christian story, Christians have good reason to take our having first-person perspectives to be central to the kind of being that we are.

The second reason for a Christian to endorse the Constitution View over Animalism is that the Constitution View allows that a person's resurrection body may be

nonidentical with her earthly biological body. According to the Constitution View, it is logically possible that a person have different bodies at different times; whether anyone ever changes bodies or not, the logical possibility is built into the Constitution View. By contrast, on the Animalist View, a person just is—is identical to—an organism. Whatever happens to the organism happens to the person. On an Animalist View, it is logically impossible for you to survive the destruction of your body. So, on an Animalist View, if Smith, say, is resurrected, then the organism that was Smith on earth must persist in heaven. The resurrection body must be that very organism. In that case, any Animalist View compatible with Christian resurrection will have implausible features about the persistence conditions for organisms.

Let me elaborate. If, as on the Animalist View, a person's postmortem body were identical to her premortem body, then we would have new questions about the persistence conditions for bodies: NonChristian Animalists understand our persistence conditions in terms of continued biological functioning. But Christian Animalists who believe in resurrection cannot construe our persistence conditions biologically unless they think that resurrected persons are maintained by digestion, respiration and so on as earthly persons are. Since postmortem bodies are incorruptible, it seems unlikely that they are maintained by biological processes (like digestion, etc.) as ours are. But if biological processes are irrelevant to the persistence conditions of *resurrected* persons, and if, as Animalism has it, biological processes are essential to *our* persistence conditions, then it does not even seem logically possible for a resurrected person to be identical to any of us. Something whose persistence conditions are biological cannot be identical to something whose persistence conditions are not biological.

To put it another way, a Christian Animalist who believes in resurrection must hold that earthly bodies, which are corruptible, are identical to resurrection bodies, which are incorruptible. Since I think that biological organisms are essentially corruptible, I do not believe that a resurrection body, which is incorruptible, could be identical to a biological organism. Even if I'm wrong about the essential corruptibility of organisms, however, the fact remains that on Christian Animalism, the persistence conditions for organisms would be beyond the purview of biology. Christian Animalist who believed in

resurrection would have to allow that organisms can undergo physically impossible changes without ceasing to exist. For example, organisms would disappear at one place (on earth at the place where the death certificate says that they died) and reappear at some other place.

Moreover, death would have to be conceived of in a very unusual way by an Animalist who is a Christian: On a Christian Animalist view, a person/organism does not really die. For example, God snatches the body away immediately before death and replaces it with a simulacrum that dies (van Inwagen). Alternatively, God makes organisms disappear at one place (on earth at the place where the death certificate says that they died) and reappear at some other place (Zimmerman). In either case, Christian Animalists who believed in resurrection would have to suppose that organisms routinely undergo physically impossible changes without ceasing to exist. Platonists would say that the body dies, but the soul never dies; it lives straight on through the body's death. Christian Animalists would have to say something even stranger: the body of a resurrected person does not die either, if by 'die' we mean cease functioning permanently. Death for human persons who will be resurrected, on this view, would just be an illusion. I do not think that that conception of death comports well with the story of the Crucifixion, which suggests that death is horrendous and not at all illusory.

So, there are several reasons why a Christian should prefer the Constitution View to Animalism. In order to make Animalism compatible with the doctrine of resurrection, the Christian Animalist would have to make two unpalatable moves: She would have to conceive of persistence conditions for organisms to be at least partly nonbiological, and she would have to reconceive the death of a human person in a way that did not involve demise of the organism to which the person is allegedly identical.

Perhaps even more important is the fact that, according to Animalism, the property of being a person or of having a first-person perspective is just a contingent and temporary property of essentially nonpersonal beings: Animalism severs what is most distinctive about us from what we most fundamentally are. On the Animalist View,

persons qua persons have no ontological significance. I think that these are all good reasons for a Christian to prefer the Constitution View to Animalism.

5. Conclusion. The doctrine of resurrection has not received as much philosophical attention as some other aspects of Christian theology (e.g., the problem of evil and the traditional arguments for the existence of God), but views on personal identity suggest intriguing possibilities for identifying conditions under which a premortem person can be identical to a postmortem person. Only if a premortem and postmortem person can be one and the same individual is resurrection even a logical possibility.

Lynne Rudder Baker
University of Massachusetts/Amherst
November 15, 2001

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