

## MAKING SENSE OF DIVINE SIMPLICITY

JEFFREY E. BROWER

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Few tenets of classical theism strike contemporary philosophers as more perplexing or difficult to comprehend than the doctrine of divine simplicity—that is, the doctrine that God is an absolutely simple being, completely devoid of any sort of metaphysical complexity. This doctrine has its roots in antiquity, perhaps tracing ultimately to Parmenides, but it receives its most elaborate development and careful defense at the hands of philosophers and theologians during the Middle Ages. According to the standard medieval understanding—as epitomized by Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas—the doctrine entails not only that God lacks the obvious forms of complexity associated with the possession of material or temporal parts, but also that he lacks even the minimal form of complexity associated with the possession of properties or attributes. Thus, from the fact that God is divine, medieval thinkers infer that God is identical with his nature or divinity; from the fact that he is good, they infer that he is identical with his goodness; and so on in every other such case. And, of course, from the fact that God is identical with each of these things, they infer that each of them is identical with each of the others.

It is easy to see why contemporary philosophers find the doctrine so difficult. As stated, it seems to entail that God is identical with each of his properties—and, by implication, that each of his properties is identical with each of the others, and hence that God is himself a property. But *that* seems absurd. “The trouble with the idea” C. B.

Martin once remarked “is just that it is hogwash”.<sup>1</sup> Other philosophers have drawn the same conclusion, sometimes going a step further and claiming, with Quentin Smith, that the doctrine is not only “plainly self-contradictory” but actually “testifies to the predominance of faith over intellectual coherence in some Christian circles.”<sup>2</sup>

Given the stature of the thinkers who have endorsed this doctrine historically, it is not surprising that a number of contemporary philosophers have come to its defense, arguing that divine simplicity is at least coherent, even if not ultimately acceptable.<sup>3</sup> For all their ingenuity, however, contemporary defenses of the doctrine continue to fall on deaf ears. My purpose in this paper is two-fold: to explain why this is case, and to mount a new defense, one that succeeds where the others have failed to resolve contemporary concerns about the doctrine’s coherence once and for all.

As will become clear when I discuss the doctrine below, there is nothing in divine simplicity itself that requires us to identify God with a property. On the contrary, the doctrine requires only that God is identical with the entities (such as *God’s goodness*, *God’s power*, and *God’s wisdom*) that are required to explain the truths expressed by true intrinsic predications of the form “God is *F*”.<sup>4</sup> That is to say, the doctrine requires nothing more than the following:

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<sup>1</sup> Martin 1976, 40.

<sup>2</sup> Smith 1998, 524, n. 3. The *locus classicus* for contemporary difficulties with simplicity is Plantinga 1980. There are, however, a number of works that have contributed in important ways to the contemporary understanding of these difficulties, including each of the following: Mann 1982, 1983; Morris 1985; and Stump and Kretzmann 1985. For some of the earliest contemporary discussions of simplicity, see Bennet 1969, Ross 1969, Martin 1976, LaCroix 1977 and 1979, and Wainwright 1979.

<sup>3</sup> More often than not, contemporary philosophers have come to the defense of Aquinas’s understanding of simplicity. Cf., e.g., Davies 1987, Dewan 1989, Kretzmann 1983, Lamont 1997, and Stump and Kretzmann 1985.

<sup>4</sup> For convenience in what follows, I will often speak of “true predications” as shorthand for the more cumbersome (and also more accurate) phrase “*the truths expressed by true intrinsic predications*”. Strictly speaking, God’s identity with his goodness, power, etc. is not dependent on the existence of the predications themselves, which are mere linguistic entities, but on the truths expressed by these predications. Again, no medieval ever thought that divine simplicity requires God to be identical with

(DS): If an intrinsic predication of the form “God is *F*” is true, then *God’s F-ness* exists and is identical with God.

But if this is all the doctrine requires, then the doctrine itself takes no stand on the precise nature of the entities with which it identifies God. Hence the apparent absurdity that God is a property follows not from divine simplicity itself, but rather from its conjunction with something like the following “property account” of predication:

(PA): If an intrinsic predication of the form “*a* is *F*” is true, then *a’s F-ness* exists, where this entity is to be understood as a property.

Although contemporary defenders of divine simplicity often recognize that something like PA is at the root of contemporary difficulties with the doctrine, they are extremely reluctant to abandon it. Indeed, as we shall see, almost all of them prefer to defend the claim that God is a property rather than develop an account of predication in terms of something other than properties. This explains, I think, the general failure of contemporary defenses of the doctrine: most accept some form of property interpretation (i.e., the conjunction of DS and PA), which certainly seems absurd; and those that don’t, fail to develop the sort of account of predication needed to render the doctrine coherent.

My own defense of simplicity is designed to pick up where these others leave off. It employs an alternative account of predication, one that makes crucial use of the notion of a truthmaker:

(TA): If an intrinsic predication of the form “*a* is *F*” is true, then *a’s F-ness* exists, where this entity is to be understood as the *truthmaker* for “*a* is *F*”.

Interpreted in light of TA, the doctrine of divine simplicity avoids the problems associated with the property interpretation. For so interpreted, the doctrine entails that God is identical with each of the *truthmakers* for the true (intrinsic) predications that can

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entities (if there are any) such as *being thought about by me*, which are introduced by purely *extrinsic* predications.

be made about him—indeed, that God himself is the truthmaker for each of these predication. Unlike the claim that God is a property, however, these claims seem perfectly coherent (at least on the assumption that truthmaker theory is itself coherent).<sup>5</sup> Obviously, there is much in this interpretation, as well as the “truthmaker account” of predication underlying it, that requires explanation and defense. But I shall postpone that until later in the paper.<sup>6</sup>

My discussion will proceed as follows. I begin in Section 1 with a brief account of the doctrine of divine simplicity, making clear why contemporary philosophers find it so natural to interpret it in terms of properties. In Section 2, I explain why, for all its attractiveness, the property interpretation of simplicity must be rejected (at least given certain standard views about properties). I then turn, in Section 3, to the task of developing a satisfactory alternative. Here I begin by critiquing what appear to be the only two suggestions that have been made in the literature, before advancing my own preferred truthmaker interpretation. Finally, I conclude my discussion, in Section 4, with a defense of the truthmaker interpretation, arguing that, in addition to providing the only way of making sense of divine simplicity, it also renders the doctrine quite attractive in certain ways.

## 1. The Doctrine of Divine Simplicity

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<sup>5</sup> In what follows I assume the coherence of truthmaker theory, as it is understood by some of its most prominent defenders, such as David Armstrong, John Bigelow, and David Lewis (more on this in §§3-4 below). Those who reject this assumption can take the conclusion of my argument to have the form of a biconditional—namely, that divine simplicity is coherent *if and only if* truthmaker theory (so understood) is.

<sup>6</sup> Brian Leftow gestures toward something like this view in his doctoral dissertation (cf. Leftow 1984, esp. 51-52, 57), though he speaks in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions rather than truthmakers. Thanks to Brian for calling this work to my attention.

Most contemporary philosophers writing on divine simplicity take themselves to be working with the doctrine as understood by thinkers such as Augustine, Anselm, or Aquinas. It will be useful, therefore, to have before us a few characteristic statements of the doctrine by these three thinkers. Here is a familiar passage from Augustine:

We speak of God in many ways—as great, good, wise, blessed, true, and whatever else does not seem unworthily said of him. Nonetheless, God is identical with his greatness, which is his wisdom (since he is not great by virtue of quantity, but by virtue of power); and he is identical with his goodness, which is his wisdom and his greatness; and he is identical with his truth, which is all of these things. For in him it is not one thing to be blessed and another to be great, or wise, or true, or to be good, or to be altogether himself. (*De Trinitate* 6.7.8)

Given Augustine’s enormous influence on the development of medieval philosophy, it is not surprising that similar passages pervade the works of Anselm and Aquinas. Consider, for example, the following passage from Anselm’s *Proslogion*:

Life, wisdom, and all the rest are not parts of you, but all are one, and each of them is the whole of what you are and the whole of what the others are. (*Proslogion* 18)

Again, here is a passage from Aquinas’s *Summa Contra Gentiles*:

In every simple thing, its being and *that which it is* are the same. For if the one were not the other, simplicity would be removed. As we have shown, however, God is absolutely simple. Hence, in God, being good is not anything distinct from him; he *is* his goodness. (SCG, I 38)

As these passages help to make clear, the doctrine of divine simplicity can be characterized in terms of the requirements it places on divine predications. What the doctrine tells us is that if a predication such as “God is good” is true, then there exists an entity, *God’s goodness*, that is identical with God; likewise, if “God is powerful” is true, then *God’s power* exists and is identical with God; and so on for other such true divine predications. Generalizing, therefore, we can (as I noted in the introduction) state the doctrine of divine simplicity as follows:

(DS): If an intrinsic predication of the form “God is *F*” is true, then *God’s F-ness* exists and is identical with God.

Stated in this way, the doctrine seems to presuppose the existence of entities corresponding to abstract singular terms such as ‘God’s goodness’, ‘God’s power’, and ‘God’s wisdom’. (Terms such as these are called ‘abstract singular terms’ because they are the abstract counterparts of concrete terms such as ‘good’, ‘powerful’, and ‘wise’ and are grammatically singular in number.) So stated, therefore, the doctrine appears to be inconsistent with certain forms of nominalism—namely, all those which deny that expressions of the form ‘*a*’s *F*-ness’ are genuinely referring devices. Even so, it must be noted that, strictly speaking, the doctrine itself is silent about the nature of the entities referred to by these expressions. For it says nothing about the ontological category to which they belong. How, then, are we to understand such entities?

It is natural to suppose that the answer must be ‘as properties’. After all, Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas all suppose that, at least in the case of creatures, (intrinsic) predications of the form “*a* is *F*” entail the existence of properties, which can in turn be referred to by expressions of the form ‘*a*’s *F*-ness’. To cite just one text as evidence, consider the following passage from Anselm’s *Monologion* in which he compares the justice of a human being to the justice of God.

A human being cannot *be* his justice, though he can *have* his justice. For the same reason, a just human being is not understood as *being* his justice (*existens iustitia*), but as *having* his justice. By contrast, it is not properly said that the supreme nature *has* its justice, but *is* its justice. Hence when the supreme nature is called just, is it properly understood as *being* its justice, rather than as *having* its justice.<sup>7</sup> (*Monologion* 16)

Here Anselm tells us that if an individual human being, say Socrates, is truly said to be just, this is because he *exemplifies* justice, which is a property distinct from him.

Evidently, therefore, Anselm takes the truth of creaturely predications such as “Socrates is just” to entail the existence of *Socrates’s justice*, where this entity is to be understood

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<sup>7</sup> The possessive pronouns do not explicitly occur in the Latin, though I think they are implicit here (as they often are in Latin).

as a property. But if expressions of the form ‘*a*’s *F*-ness’ refer to properties in the case of creatures, why should they behave any differently in the case of God? To the extent that medieval thinkers suppose that creaturely predications imply the existence of properties, therefore, it is natural to suppose they do so on the basis of a perfectly general account of predication (and abstract reference)—what I earlier called ‘the property account’:

(PA): If an intrinsic predication of the form “*a* is *F*” is true, then *a*’s *F*-ness exists, where this entity is to be understood as a property.

The plausibility of attributing PA to the medievals is reinforced by the intuitive nature of PA itself. For this account just appears to make explicit something that, as contemporary philosophers, we often take for granted. We habitually speak as if for any true predication whatsoever, there is a subject of predication (e.g., Socrates), there is property (e.g., justice), and the subject exemplifies the property (e.g., Socrates *is* just).<sup>8</sup>

In light of the foregoing, there seems to be good reason initially to accept a property interpretation of divine simplicity—that is to say, one that combines the doctrine as stated at DS with the property account at PA. Of course, interpreting the doctrine in this way has the immediate consequence that God is identical with each of his properties, and hence is himself a property. But this consequence, as we shall see, is one that most contemporary defenders of simplicity are willing to accept.

## 2. Property Interpretations of Simplicity

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<sup>8</sup> Thus, the account at PA involves what is often called an “abundant” (as opposed to a “sparse”) theory of properties. Of course, we also recognize that there is one sort of case to which the property account cannot be said to apply, namely, predications involving the predicate ‘is non-selfexemplifiable’. For as Russell has taught us, the assumption that there is a property corresponding to this predicate immediately leads to paradox (since such a property must either exemplify itself or not, but in either case we get a contradiction). In what follows, I ignore this complication and continue to speak of PA as a general account of predication, since it assumes that all predications *except those leading to Russell’s paradox* can be explained in terms of properties. For an example of a defense of PA that is considered by its author to be general *in this sense*, see van Inwagen 2002.

Perhaps no one has done more to highlight the apparent absurdity of the property interpretation of divine simplicity than Alvin Plantinga. Indeed, ever since the publication of his 1980 monograph, *Does God Have a Nature?*, the literature on divine simplicity has been dominated by the question of whether it is coherent to say that God is identical with each of his (intrinsic) properties. As Plantinga points out, there are at least two reasons for thinking it is not:

In the first place, if God is identical with each of his properties, then each of his properties is identical with each of his properties, so that he has but one property ... In the second place, if God is identical with each of his properties, then since each of his properties is a property, he is a property—a self-exemplifying property. (Plantinga 1980, 47)<sup>9</sup>

Although the first consideration “seems flatly incompatible with the obvious fact that God has several properties,” it is the difficulty raised by the second that Plantinga regards as “truly monumental”:

No property could have created the world; no property could be omniscient, or indeed, know anything at all. If God is a property, then he isn't a person but a mere abstract object; he has no knowledge, awareness, power, love or life. So taken, the simplicity doctrine seems to be an utter mistake. (Plantinga 1980, 47)

It is not hard to agree with Plantinga's conclusion here, at least on the assumption that properties are abstract objects. For no such object could be a person, much less a person responsible for the creation of the universe, capable of love, knowledge, power, awareness, and life.

*2.1 Properties as Universals.* I think it is fair to say that most philosophers writing about simplicity since Plantinga have assumed that the apparent absurdity of the doctrine derives entirely from the specific conception of properties in terms of which Plantinga

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<sup>9</sup> For important discussion of both difficulties in the literature, see Forrest 1996, Hughes 1989, Mann 1986, Stump and Kretzmann 1985, and Wolterstorff 1991. For discussion of other difficulties raised by simplicity, specifically concerning divine freedom, cf. Mann 1988 and Stump and Kretzmann 1985.

interprets it. As is clear from the passages just quoted, Plantinga espouses a form of *Platonic realism*—that is, a conception of properties according to which they are a specific type of abstract entity, namely, *universals*. Most defenders of simplicity would admit that *this* conception raises problems for the doctrine. But insofar as it represents only one of several respectable ways of conceiving of properties, they assume that these problems can be avoided merely by adopting some other conception of properties.

Although it would be possible to develop a version of the property interpretation in terms of some form of *Aristotelian* (as opposed to Platonic) *realism*—according to which properties are *concrete* (as opposed to abstract) universals—no one to my knowledge has attempted to do so. Nor is it hard to see why. The claim that God is a concrete universal seems just as problematic as the claim that he is an abstract universal. For by their very nature, universals are multiply exemplifiable entities—that is to say, entities capable of being exemplified by more than one thing at a time; and concrete universals are typically regarded as constituents of the concrete particulars that possess them.<sup>10</sup> Thus, interpreting simplicity in terms of concrete universals would have the consequence that God is both multiply exemplifiable and capable of serving as a constituent of other concrete particulars. But each of these consequences seems absurd. Certainly there are one-many relations in which God stands to concrete particulars; and we may, if we like, follow the neo-Platonists in speaking of such relations in terms of *participation*. But it doesn't follow that God can literally be multiply exemplified, for only universals can stand in *that* relation to particulars and no concrete particular is a

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<sup>10</sup> For a defense of the concrete conception of properties, also commonly referred to as 'immanent realism', see Armstrong 1978, vol. 2, chap. 3 and Armstrong 1997, chaps. 3-4.

universal.<sup>11</sup> Nor would it seem plausible, at least on the classical conception of deity, to say that God is a constituent of anything else. For according to the classical conception, God is a transcendent being.<sup>12</sup> Evidently, therefore, if we are going to defend the coherence of identifying God with a property, we must formulate a theory of properties according to which at least some properties are both *concrete* and *individual*.

*2.2 Properties as Concrete Individuals.* As far as I know the first person in the contemporary literature to adopt a version of the properties-as-concrete-individuals interpretation is William Mann (1982). Although his specific version of this interpretation faces seriously difficulties, it nonetheless suggests a general type of interpretation that might seem quite promising.

According to Mann, when medievals such as Aquinas identify God with *his* nature, *his* goodness, and *his* power, they do so with the intention of identifying God with what he calls *property instances*—that is, concrete individuals that stand in a special relation (namely, instantiation) to Platonic universals of which they are the instances.<sup>13</sup> As Mann sees it, therefore, we must distinguish between two very different kinds of property—abstract universal properties such as goodness, power, and wisdom, and concrete individual properties such as God’s goodness, God’s power, and God’s wisdom, which are concrete instances of the corresponding universals. With this distinction in hand, he suggests that the medieval doctrine of simplicity requires the identification of

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<sup>11</sup> When the neo-Platonists (or, for that matter, philosophers such as Aquinas) speak of creatures as *participating* in God, they don’t really mean to suggest that God is *exemplified* by creatures, and hence is a universal. On the contrary, they typically mean that creatures are resemblances of, and hence beings causally dependent on, God. For discussion of this conception of participation, as well as the attribution of it to Plato himself, see Allen 1960.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Aquinas’s discussion of this issue in *Summa Theologiae* Ia, q. 8, a. 1.

<sup>13</sup> Mann 1982; cf. Mann 1983.

God with properties of only the latter sort. Thus, if God and one of his creatures, such as Socrates, are both good, it will be true that they both stand in relation to the universal goodness. At the same time, however, it will also be true that they stand in this relation by virtue of possessing their own numerically distinct, concrete individual instances of goodness—namely, *God's goodness* in the case of God (which is identical with God), and *Socrates's goodness* in the case of Socrates (which is distinct from him). But, of course, if this is correct, then the medieval doctrine can preserve the intuition that God is a concrete individual.

Although initially promising, the property-instance interpretation of simplicity must ultimately be rejected. As is often pointed out, one of the chief motivations historically for the doctrine of divine simplicity is divine *aseity*—that is, the view that God is an absolutely independent being, and hence exists entirely from himself (*a se*).<sup>14</sup> But if God is a property instance, he will lack *aseity*. For property instances, at least as Mann conceives them, are dependent for their existence on the universals of which they are the instances. Thus, if God is identical with his goodness, even where his goodness is conceived as a property instance, God will depend for his existence on something distinct from himself, namely, the universal property of which his goodness is an instance, *being good*; and the same will be true for each of his other property instances.<sup>15</sup>

It might be thought that this objection could be avoided, and the properties-as-concrete-individuals interpretation upheld, if we simply denied the Platonic aspect of Mann's view, and conceived of properties in terms of what are now standardly called 'tropes' (rather than property instances). Like property instances, tropes are concrete

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<sup>14</sup> See Bergmann and Brower 2004; Jordan 1983, esp. 176-179; Leftow 1990, 584-592; and Plantinga 1980, 28-37.

<sup>15</sup> Morris (1985) criticizes Mann on these grounds, as does Wolterstorff (1991) and Vallicella (1992).

individuals, but unlike them, they are not generally thought to require the existence of universals to explain their similarity or “sameness”. Thus, if it is asked in virtue of what two (or more) tropes of whiteness resemble each other, the answer will typically appeal to nothing more than the tropes themselves. Just in virtue of being the concrete individuals they are, they resemble each other with respect to color. End of story.<sup>16</sup>

Would a trope-theoretic version of the property interpretation fare any better than Mann’s property-instance interpretation?<sup>17</sup> The answer, it seems, is ‘no’. For although identifying God with a trope would avoid making him dependent on a universal (since according to most trope theorists, there are no universals), it would not succeed in making him absolutely independent. For even tropes, as they are usually conceived, are dependent beings—that is, concrete individuals depending for their existence on something distinct from themselves (namely, the subjects to which they belong). But, then, even if God is identified with a trope, he will lack aseity. Of course, one could reject the usual conception of tropes, maintaining instead that tropes have a measure of independence—that they are (in A. J. Ayer’s memorable phrase) “junior substances”. But even this new proposal faces a serious difficulty—indeed what I take to be the chief difficulty for any every version of the property interpretation. Regardless of how else they are conceived, tropes are *properties*. But, then, even if they are conceived of as independent beings, they will still be distinguished from substances proper—“senior

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<sup>16</sup> For discussion of trope nominalism, see Armstrong 1989, Campbell 1980 and 1990, and Smith, Mulligan, and Simons 1984.

<sup>17</sup> Interestingly, in later work, Mann (1986, 343-353) explicitly considers the aseity objection as well as the trope-nominalistic reply, though he even here he does not adopt it. Like so many other defenders of simplicity, he is simply unwilling in the end to abandon Platonic realism altogether, and hence tries to rebut the objection from within a realist framework. For discussion of Mann’s new reply, including the new problems it raises, see Wolterstorff 1991, 538-540.

substances”—insofar as properties can (whereas as concrete particular substances cannot) be exemplified.

Of course, there is one final step that the defender of the property interpretation could take—namely, reject that properties in general, and tropes in particular, must be conceived of as entities capable of being exemplified. At one time I thought this was just the sort of response required to make sense of divine simplicity. But I am now convinced that it is mistaken. For unlike the other features of properties we have been considering (abstractness, universality, and dependency), the capacity for being exemplified appears to be constitutive of, and hence inseparable from, the concept of a property.<sup>18</sup> Indeed, this is precisely what lies behind the traditional view that properties are entities categorially distinct from particulars. Both properties and particulars may be the subject of further properties, and hence can both be said to *exemplify* other things, but only particulars are such that they cannot be *exemplified* by anything else. (For the sake of convenience, I use the term ‘individual’ to contrast with ‘universal’, and the term

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<sup>18</sup> There are philosophers who admit the existence of unexemplifiable properties, such as *being red and not being red*. But as Chris Swoyer (2000, §1) points out, “even they typically believe that such properties are intimately related to other properties (here *being red* and *not being red*) that can be exemplified”. The idea is that there are basic or “simple” properties, all of which *can* be exemplified, and there are derivative or “complex” properties, some of which *cannot* be exemplified. But even those “complex” properties that cannot be exemplified are such that their analysis includes the basic properties from which they are derived, so that exemplifiability turns out to be constitutive even of their concepts.

It might be objected (as a referee for this journal pointed out) that there are conceptions of properties, perfectly standard in some contexts, that don’t involve the concept of exemplifiability, even for simple properties. Suppose, for example, that properties are conceived of as sets of possibilities, or functions from possible worlds to sets of possibilities. In that case, even unexemplifiable properties like *being red and not red* will be simple (or at least as “simple” as any other property). Doesn’t this raise a problem for my argument, since it depends on the claim that being exemplifiable is part of the concept of property? I think not—and this for three reasons. First, I deny that these alternative conceptions are really conceptions of *properties* (as opposed to, say, entities that can play many of the same functional roles as properties). Second, all my argument strictly requires is the claim that being exemplifiable is part of the concept of property *operative in discussions of divine simplicity*. But as we shall see (in §2.3), this requirement is met: all the parties to the debate about simplicity at least *begin* with the assumption that properties are exemplifiables. Third and finally, since these other conceptions of properties are no better off than the traditional conception as regards making sense of divine simplicity (indeed, they entail the very same sorts of absurdity it does—namely, that God is an abstract object like a set or function), they can safely be ignored.

‘particular’ to refer to a proper subset of individuals, namely, those individuals that cannot be had by anything else, and hence are not properties.)

It is important to emphasize that the traditional distinction between properties and particulars is consistent with conceiving of properties in any one of a number of ways: as abstract or concrete, as universal or individual, as property instances or tropes, as dependent beings or independent beings. The traditional distinction is also consistent with the fact that properties can be (and nowadays often are) associated with a wide variety of functional roles or offices (e.g., solving the problem of universals; providing the meaning for certain types of expressions; explaining laws of nature, conceptual analysis, mathematics, or modality).<sup>19</sup> About the only thing it is not consistent with is the conception of properties as particulars. For on the traditional view, it is the fact that properties can be exemplified that explains their being properties.

*2.3 Properties as Particulars.* In light of the foregoing, we may state the fundamental difficulty for any version of the property interpretation succinctly as follows:

- (1) God is a particular.
  - (2) No particular can be a property (i.e., an exemplifiable).
- ∴ (3) God cannot be identical with a property (no matter how entities of this type are conceived).

Premise 1, I take it, is non-negotiable, since according to traditional theism, God is a person, and persons are particulars.<sup>20</sup> I have also been speaking as if premise 2 were non-negotiable. In fact, however, premise 2 has been challenged at several places in the literature. Katherin Rogers (1996), for example, has suggested that even if there is a categorial divide between particulars and certain types of properties, which she calls

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<sup>19</sup> Cf. Oliver 1996, and Swoyer 2000.

<sup>20</sup> As I indicated earlier (in note 9), neo-Platonic conceptions of God, according to which God is that in which all things participate, do not require the violation of premise 1.

*qualities* or *traits*, there is no such division separating particulars and what medievals such as Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas call *actions*—a special type of concrete individual that, at least in the case of creatures, *inheres in* or is *exemplified by* particulars. (Evidently, therefore, such “actions” are not to be confused with events, as contemporary philosophers think of them.) But, then, provided we identify God only with “actions” of this specific sort, a version of the property interpretation can be upheld—or so Rogers’s discussion suggests.<sup>21</sup>

Again, Brian Leftow (1990) has suggested that the failure of the traditional conception of properties and particulars, and hence the falsity of premise 2, is precisely the lesson to be drawn from the doctrine of divine simplicity. As Leftow sees it, divine simplicity *does* entail that God is a property. Even so, he argues, it does not follow (as Plantinga suggests) that God is an abstract object and hence not a person, even if (like Plantinga) we are initially inclined to accept a form of Platonic realism. If God is identical with a property *P*, then admittedly it follows that there is only one thing where we might originally have thought there were two (namely, God and *P*). Again, this single thing must have all the characteristics that God really has and all the characteristics that *P* really has. But as Leftow rightly points out, these characteristics may constitute only a proper subset of those originally associated with God and *P*. Thus, if God is a particular and *P* is a property, it *may* turn out that some particulars (namely, God) are abstract

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<sup>21</sup> See Rogers 1996, esp. 170-172. Rogers would not accept my description of her view, for she denies that the term ‘property’ can be applied to what the medievals call actions on the grounds that actions are done or performed, whereas properties (i.e., qualities or traits) are possessed. This restriction on the scope of the application of the term, however, seems artificial and even misleading in the context of the medieval philosophical tradition that she claims to be representing. For as indicated in the text itself, when the medievals speak of *actions* (*actiones*), what they have in mind are concrete individuals *inhering in* or *belonging to* particulars—which, of course, is why they follow Aristotle in identifying actions (or at least creaturely actions) as one of the nine categories of accidents (i.e., accidental properties). For a representative medieval discussion of actions, see Aquinas’s *Sententia super Physicam* III, lect. 5.

entities capable of being exemplified (in which case Plantinga's conclusion would be right, God is *not* a person). But then again, it *may also* turn out that some properties (namely, *P*) are concrete particulars and hence incapable of exemplification (in which case there is no problem with saying that God is a person). For obvious reasons, Leftow opts for the latter conclusion.<sup>22</sup>

By far the most explicit attempt to challenge the traditional conception of properties and particulars occurs in William Vallicella's (1992) treatment of divine simplicity. Vallicella grants that something is a property if and only if it can be exemplified. He also grants that particulars are such that they cannot be multiply exemplified nor exemplified by anything distinct from themselves. As he points out, however, the conjunction of these two claims is consistent with the view that particulars are capable of being exemplified *by themselves*, and hence of also qualifying as properties. Vallicella recommends, therefore, that we identify God with his properties and then construe God's properties as entities that can be exemplified only by themselves. Here again, the motivation is clearly to uphold a version of the property interpretation.<sup>23</sup>

As I have already indicated, rejecting the traditional conception of properties and particulars as part of a strategy for making sense of divine simplicity strikes me as misguided. For one thing, it seems *ad hoc*. What reason, apart from the desire to make sense of this doctrine, could there be for abandoning the traditional conception of properties and particulars? Some, such as Leftow (1990, 582-3), have given arguments for the truth of divine simplicity. But even if compelling, these arguments wouldn't

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<sup>22</sup> See Leftow 1990, 593-594.

<sup>23</sup> See Vallicella 1992, esp. 512-519.

require the identification of God with a property. For as we shall see, it is perfectly possible to interpret the doctrine in such a way that *no* property-identifications follow from it.

A more serious difficulty is that, in requiring us to reject the traditional distinction between properties and particulars, this strategy threatens to undermine our understanding of these entities altogether. After all, if the traditional distinction is rejected, what is to be put in its place? Vallicella is the only person I know of to have explicitly addressed this concern. As we have seen, however, his suggestion is that we replace the distinction with following: *properties* are entities exemplifiable either by themselves or by things distinct from themselves, whereas *particulars* are entities exemplifiable, if at all, only by themselves. Vallicella goes so far as to claim that there is nothing in our ordinary concept of property or particular to prevent this replacement. Here, however, he seems to be mistaken—at least if by ‘ordinary concepts of property or particular’ he just means ‘the concepts as they are ordinarily understood by contemporary (analytic) philosophers’. In fact, some philosophers seem to have trouble even making sense of the view that *properties* are self-exemplifying, not to mention the view that particulars are.<sup>24</sup>

None of this is meant to establish that the traditional conception of properties and particulars is unassailable, or that it is impossible to find a replacement for it. On the contrary, it is meant only to show that, *in the context of simplicity*, where the traditional conception is standardly taken for granted, rejecting it seems unnecessarily extreme—

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<sup>24</sup> Cf. Nicholas Wolterstorff (1991, 548):

[A] characteristic feature of our contemporary way of practicing ... ontology which plays a role in discussions over simplicity is a clear-eyed denial of the Platonic thesis that that properties are ideal examples of themselves—that justice is the ideally just entity, etc. We hold that, in general, properties are not self-exemplifying.

especially if there is another, much more plausible interpretation of the doctrine available. I conclude, therefore, that if we want to make sense of this divine simplicity, our best hope is not to abandon the traditional conception of properties and particulars, but rather to abandon the attempt to interpret the doctrine in terms of properties.

### 3. **Alternative Interpretations of Simplicity**

If the property interpretation of divine simplicity leads to unacceptable consequences, then we appear to have no choice but to search for another way of interpreting the doctrine. More specifically, if the claim that God is identical with his nature, goodness, and power cannot be interpreted in such a way that the expressions ‘God’s nature’, ‘God’s goodness’, and ‘God’s power’ refer to properties, we must find some alternative interpretation according to which these locutions refer to entities of some other type. But to what other type of entities can they plausibly be taken to refer?

There is very little discussion of this question in the contemporary literature. In fact, there appear to be only two suggestions that have been developed—namely, (a) that abstract singular terms refer to *states of affairs*, and (b) that they refer to metaphysical *constituents* of particulars. Although neither suggestion is ultimately acceptable, both are worth exploring briefly, since the reasons for their failure are instructive: they point the way not only to an adequate interpretation of simplicity, but also to the conditions that must be met by any adequate interpretation.

*3.1 The State-of-affairs Interpretation.* States of affairs provide what is, perhaps, the most obvious suggestion for a type of entity (other than properties) to serve as the

referents for expressions of the form ‘*a*’s *F*-ness’. Plantinga (1980), who seems to have been the first to consider this suggestion in the context of simplicity, develops it as follows:

Suppose we consider Socrates and wisdom: we can distinguish Socrates from wisdom and each of them from the state of affairs *Socrates’ being wise*—a state of affairs that obtains or is actual if and only if Socrates displays wisdom. Perhaps we could refer to *Socrates’ being wise* by the locutions ‘Socrates’ having wisdom’ or ‘the wisdom of Socrates’ or even ‘Socrates’ wisdom.’ And when Aquinas speaks of God’s life or God’s wisdom, perhaps we may take him as speaking of the state of affairs consisting in God’s being wise and having life. (Plantinga 1980, 48)

In effect, Plantinga is suggesting here that, instead of interpreting simplicity in terms of a property account of predication and abstract reference, we interpret it in terms of a “state-of-affairs account” of these phenomena:

(SA): If an intrinsic predication of the form “*a* is *F*” is true, then *a*’s *F*-ness exists, where this entity is to be understood as a state of affairs.

There is one respect in which Plantinga claims the state-of-affairs interpretation is clearly superior to any form of property interpretation. The state-of-affairs interpretation can (whereas the property interpretation cannot) immediately deflect the difficulty of explaining how God’s goodness, power, wisdom, and so on can all be identical with one another. For as he says “while it is obviously absurd to claim that wisdom and power are the very same property, it is not obviously absurd to hold that *God’s being wise* is the same state of affairs as *God’s being powerful*.”<sup>25</sup> Even so, Plantinga thinks the state-of-affairs must ultimately be rejected. For states of affairs are abstract objects and hence no more capable than properties of creating the universe or possessing knowledge, awareness, power, love, or life.<sup>26</sup> Again, states of affairs are essentially such as to obtain or fail to obtain, whereas particulars are not.

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<sup>25</sup> Plantinga 1980, 49.

<sup>26</sup> Plantinga 1980, 52.

In response, it is tempting to adopt the strategy employed earlier by Leftow (1990), noting that even if the identification of God with a state of affairs *might* be taken to show that God is a certain type of abstract object, it might *just as well* be taken to show that certain states of affairs (such as *God's being wise* or *God's being powerful*) are concrete particulars. Assuming we opt for the latter conclusion, however, the objection would seem to be avoided.

Note, however, that adopting this line of response requires us to reject the view that there is any categorial difference between states of affairs and particulars—just as the earlier adoption of this strategy required us to reject the view that there is a categorial difference between properties and particulars. Those, like Plantinga, who start off conceiving of states of affairs as *abstracta* will, no doubt, find the rejection of this sort of dualism implausible—indeed, just as implausible as the rejection of that between properties and particulars. Even so, there are resources for responding to this claim that weren't available in the case of properties. For states of affairs *can*, even if properties cannot, be conceived of in a way that is amenable to their identification with particulars. As is well known, David Armstrong has argued that the particulars of ordinary experience (what he calls “thick particulars”) are nothing but *concrete* states of affairs.<sup>27</sup> In doing so, he appears to be suggesting that we conceive of them roughly along the lines of what other philosophers call *facts*, *events*, or *property exemplifications*. But there is nothing obviously absurd about identifying particulars with entities of this sort (or at least we may assume this is true). But, then, what objection can there be to conceiving of God in this way as well?

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<sup>27</sup> Cf. Armstrong 1997; for the distinction between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ particulars, see 123-126. Gustav Bergmann held a similar conception of particulars. Cf. Wolterstorff 1970 for references and discussion.

The short answer is that such a conception of God conflicts with the standard understanding of divine simplicity. As we have seen, this doctrine requires that God lacks *any* metaphysical parts, constituents, or complexity whatsoever. But concrete states of affairs, as they are typically conceived, are structured complexes having constituents.<sup>28</sup> Thus, an ordinary (thick) particular such as Socrates, on Armstrong's view, is a structured complex whose constituents are a bare substratum (or "thin particular") and various properties (namely, those that make up Socrates's nature). But, then, evidently, an absolutely simple God cannot be identified with a state of affairs of this sort.

Of course, one could always *try* to modify the standard concrete-state-of-affairs conception in order to handle cases of simple particulars. But even if successful, it would still be the case that *no* state-of-affairs interpretation can succeed in rendering the doctrine of divine simplicity coherent. For this sort of interpretation is based on the general account of predication and abstract reference at SA, which takes *all* expressions of the form '*a*'s *F*-ness' to refer to states of affairs. As we have seen, however, key proponents of the divine simplicity—thinkers such as Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas—all assume, at least in the case of creatures, that expressions of the form '*a*'s *F*-ness' can refer to properties. Thus, 'Socrates's justice', they say, refers to a quality that is distinct from and exemplified by Socrates. In order to make sense of this assumption, the defender of the state-of-affairs interpretation would have to say that, at least in the case of creatures, states of affairs can be identified with properties. But that seems absurd on any conception of states of affairs: no state of affairs, whether simple or complex, can be exemplified, whereas properties are by nature exemplifiable.

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<sup>28</sup> Cf. again Armstrong 1997.

This last criticism actually brings us to an important respect in which both the property and the state-of-affairs interpretations fail. As we can now see, both interpretations take for granted what might be called a ‘single-category account’ of predication and abstract reference—that is to say, an account according to which the entities such as *God’s justice* and *Socrates’s justice* belong to a *single* ontological category. Thus, all versions of the property interpretation take for granted that such entities belong to the category of *property*, whereas all versions of the state-of-affairs interpretation take for granted they belong to the category of *state of affairs*. The problem, however, is that the doctrine of divine simplicity cannot be interpreted solely in terms of either properties or states of affairs—or indeed in terms of entities belonging to *any* single ontological category. As our earlier discussion of Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas makes clear, the doctrine must be understood in terms of an account of predication and abstract reference that allows for expressions of the form ‘*a’s F-ness*’ to refer both to properties (as in the case of *Socrates’s justice*) and to concrete particulars (as in the case of *God’s justice*). But no single-category account of predication can do that, since no single ontological category can include both concrete particulars and properties.

In the end, therefore, Plantinga appears to have been right—though not for the reasons he suggests—to suppose that the state-of-affairs interpretation is just as unacceptable as the property interpretation. Indeed, summarizing our results to this point, we may say that *no* interpretation that presupposes a single-category account of predication can possibly be used to make sense of divine simplicity—regardless of

whether the single category in question is taken to be *property*, *state of affairs*, or any other.

3.2 *The Constituent Interpretation.* If we want to avoid the problems associated with interpretations of simplicity that take for granted a single-category theory of predication, we must adopt a new account of predication—one that characterizes the referents of abstract expressions in a way that is consistent with their belonging to *different* ontological categories (in particular, the categories of *concrete particular* and *property*). But what must such an account look like? In answering this question, we can do no better than to start with an account suggested by Nicholas Wolterstorff (1991).

According to Wolterstorff, contemporary difficulties with divine simplicity all stem from the fact that we now approach the doctrine from the perspective of a theoretical framework that is foreign to the one in which it was traditionally understood. Although Wolterstorff doesn't explicitly characterize these differences in theoretical frameworks in terms of what they say about predication and abstract reference, it is clear that this is how he's thinking of them.<sup>29</sup> Consider, for example, how he contrasts the two frameworks with respect to what they say about the possession of natures or essences:

It has become habitual for us twentieth-century philosophers, when thinking of essences, to think of things *having* essences, and to think of these essences as certain properties or sets of properties. An essence is thus for us an abstract entity. For a medieval, I suggest, an essence or nature was just as concrete [and individual] as that of which it is the nature ... Naturally the medieval will speak of something as *having* a certain nature. But the *having* here is to be understood as *having as one of its constituents*. Very much of the difference between medieval and contemporary ontology hangs on these two different construals of "having". Whereas for the medievals, *having*

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<sup>29</sup> Wolterstorff speaks, at various points in his article, of the need for 'a theory of predication' in connection with divine simplicity, but what he means by this is a theory about the *semantics* of predication—one that will explain how a multiplicity of predicates with distinct senses or meanings can be predicated of a simple God. When I speak of the need for a theory of predication, however, what I have in mind is theory about the *metaphysics* of predication—one that explains the nature of the entities required both for the truth of predication and for the referents of abstract singular terms.

*an essence* was, having an essence as one of its constituents, for us, *having an essence* is, having an essence as one of its properties: exemplifying it. (Wolterstorff 1991, 541-542)

Wolterstorff's point in the passage seems to be this: whereas contemporary philosophers conceive of predication in terms of subjects exemplifying properties, the medievals conceive of predication in terms of subjects possessing constituents. Thus, when contemporary philosophers speak of essences (or more generally, of the referents of abstract expressions of the form '*a*'s *F*-ness'), what they have in mind are abstract (universal) properties. By contrast, when the medievals speak of such entities, what they have in mind are concrete (individual) constituents. As Wolterstorff sees it, therefore, contemporary philosophers approach the doctrine of divine simplicity from the perspective of a property (or property-as-universals) account of predication and abstract reference, whereas the medievals approach it from the perspective of what might be called 'the constituent account':

(CA): If an intrinsic predication of the form "*a* is *F*" is true, then *a*'s *F*-ness exists, where this entity is to be understood as a metaphysical constituent of *a*.

Wolterstorff's diagnosis of contemporary difficulties with simplicity seems plausible in light of our earlier discussion. The property account at PA *is* at the root of most contemporary puzzlement over the doctrine. Moreover, the suggestion that the medievals interpret the doctrine in terms of CA (rather than PA) is promising. For CA is the only account of predication and abstract reference we've considered so far that is categorially neutral. That is to say, unlike the others we've considered, CA alone characterizes the referents of abstract expressions of the form '*a*'s *F*-ness' in terms of an ontological type—namely, *constituent*—whose further specification can include both concrete particulars and properties. Thus, the view that results from interpreting simplicity in terms of CA—namely, that God is identical with each of his constituents,

and hence has only one constituent, himself—seems perfectly coherent (at least if we allow for the notion of an “improper” constituent, on the model of an improper part in mereology). Note, too, that this view is consistent with the claim that expressions of the form ‘*a*’s *F*-ness’ refer to properties in the case of creatures. For there is no obvious absurdity in saying that creatures have properties among their (proper) constituents, whereas God does not. Indeed, CA seems tailor-made for allowing that an expressions like ‘*a*’s justice’ refers to a property in the case of a creature such as Socrates, but to a concrete individual in the case of God.

Wolterstorff’s constituent interpretation seems to me by far the best interpretation of divine simplicity currently on offer, and I suspect that it has done more than any other to convince people that the doctrine is coherent.<sup>30</sup> Even so, it seems to me that the theory of predication and abstract reference underlying it is unacceptably incomplete. For even if it makes sense to say that expressions such as ‘Socrates’s justice’ or ‘Socrates’s nature’ refer to constituents of Socrates, CA gives us no way of distinguishing these constituents. This seems problematic. After all, *Socrates’s nature* is not just any constituent of Socrates, but that constituent *in virtue of which* he is human; likewise, *Socrates’s justice* is not just any constituent of him, but that constituent *in virtue of which* he is just (as opposed to, say, human or powerful); and so on for the referents of every other such abstract expression. In general, we need a way of distinguishing these sorts of constituents, if only because in many cases they really are distinct. According to Aquinas, for example, the referents of ‘Socrates’s nature’ and ‘Socrates’s justice’ are not only distinct from each other but also distinct from Socrates. It is hard to see how this can be explained, however, unless we add something like the following: although

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<sup>30</sup> Cf., e.g., the approving remarks in Freddoso 2002, xxxiv-xxxv.

‘Socrates’s nature’ and ‘Socrates’s justice’ both refer to constituents of Socrates, ‘Socrates’s nature’ refers to that constituent *which makes him* human, whereas ‘Socrates’s justice’ refers to that constituent *which makes him* just.

Note that the same sort of problem arises in the case of God as well. For even if God is absolutely simple, and hence identical with each of his constituents, we can still draw a conceptual distinction between *God’s nature* and *his justice* or *power* (for surely expressions such as ‘God’s nature’, ‘God’s justice’, and ‘God’s power’ are distinct in sense, even if not in reference). But here again, it seems that we can draw the relevant sort of distinction only if we characterize the constituents in question as follows: *God’s nature* is that constituent *in virtue of which* he is divine, and *his justice* and *power*, respectively, are those constituents *in virtue of which* he is just and powerful. But to describe God’s constituents in this way is already to invoke the notion of a *truthmaker*. For as hinted in the case of creatures, to say that a given entity is *that in virtue of which* something is *F* is just to say it is that *which makes it F*, or alternatively, that which “makes it true” that it is *F*.

Evidently, therefore, in order to remove the incompleteness associated with Wolterstorff’s constituent account, we must revise CA along the following lines:

(CA\*): If an intrinsic predication of the form “*a* is *F*” is true, then *a*’s *F-ness* exists, where this entity is to be understood as that (proper or improper) constituent of *a* which makes true “*a* is *F*”.

Significantly, however, once we revise the constituent account in this way, so as to make explicit reference to truthmakers, it becomes possible to distinguish (at least conceptually) the referents of ‘Socrates’s nature’ and ‘Socrates’s justice’, as well as the referents of ‘God’s nature’ and ‘God’s justice’. For on this revised constituent account, the referents of abstract expressions are identified in relation to the predications they

make true. Thus, if the predications are distinct, there will be grounds for at least a conceptual distinction of the referents.

As we have seen, this sort of distinction is just what is needed to remove the incompleteness associated with Wolterstorff's constituent interpretation of divine simplicity. Once it is introduced, however, his interpretation seems unobjectionable. For now the claim that God is identical with his nature will just amount to the claim that he is identical with that constituent which makes him divine—i.e., his *divine-making* constituent; again, the claim that he is identical with his justice will amount to the claim that he is identical with his *just-making* constituent; and so on for every other such theistic identity claim. Notice, moreover, that this same distinction enable us to make sense of the claim that God's constituents are each identical with one another. For now to say this will just amount to saying that God's divine-making constituent is identical with his good-making constituent, and indeed that God has only one constituent, himself, that makes true each of the (intrinsic) predications that can be truly made about him.

Even without further comment, it should be clear that the revised constituent interpretation goes considerable distance toward rendering the doctrine of divine simplicity coherent. It does not succumb to any of the problems plaguing the other contemporary interpretations of simplicity. Nor is there is anything obviously absurd about saying that God is himself the truthmaker for each of the true (intrinsic) predications that can be made about him. I will have much more to say about the plausibility of this sort of interpretation in the next section of the paper. Before I can do so, however, I need make clear that in moving from the original to the revised constituent

interpretation of simplicity, we have in fact introduced a new type of interpretation—one whose plausibility in fact has nothing to do with constituents.

*3.3 The Truthmaker Interpretation.* Although the revised constituent interpretation makes reference to both constituents and truthmakers, it is the notion of *truthmaking* (rather than *constituency*) that is really doing the important theoretical work. The easiest way to establish this is to show that the revised constituent interpretation can be stated just as plausibly without any reference to constituents whatsoever. Suppose, therefore, that instead of interpreting divine simplicity in terms of CA\*, we interpret it in terms of the following “truthmaker account” of predication and abstract reference:

(TA): If an intrinsic predication of the form “*a* is *F*” is true, then *a*’s *F*-ness exists, where this entity is to be understood as the truthmaker for “*a* is *F*”.<sup>31</sup>

As the reader can verify, this account is exactly like CA\* except that it drops the requirement that truthmakers be constituents of any sort. Note, however, that when we interpret the doctrine of simplicity in terms of it, we arrive at the same view that makes the revised constituent interpretation seem so promising—namely, that God is identical

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<sup>31</sup> It might seem objectionable that I contrast TA with the other sorts of accounts we’ve been considering—namely, PA, SA, and CA—by calling only the former ‘a truth-maker account’. For each of these other theories might itself seem to be a form of truth-maker theory in that, like TA, they aim to explain *why* certain predications are true by saying what makes them true.

It is important to recognize, however, that in addition to explaining the truth of certain predications (or the truths expressed by them), TA invokes the notion of a truthmaker in another more fundamental way. The suggestion made by TA is that the most important feature common to all truthmakers for claims of the form ‘The truth expressed by predication X is true’ is just that they are *truthmakers*. But according to each of the other theories, there is another more important feature that all such truth-makers have in common—subjects exemplifying a property in the case of PA, the existence (or obtaining) of states of affairs in the case of SA, and the possession of constituents in the case of CA. It is only because TA invokes the notion of a truth-maker in this more fundamental way that I call it (but not PA, SA, or CA) a ‘truthmaker theory of predication’.

with the truthmakers for each of his (intrinsic) predications. The only difference is that we now arrive at this view directly, without any intermediate reference to constituents.<sup>32</sup>

The fact that the truthmaker interpretation of simplicity can be adequately stated without any reference to constituents (but not vice versa), confirms that it is the notion of *truthmaking* (rather than *constituency*) that is crucial for interpreting the doctrine of simplicity. Indeed, it suggests that to whatever extent the revised constituent interpretation succeeds as an interpretation, it does so precisely because it is a *species* of the truthmaker interpretation. But if this is correct, there would appear to be no reason to appeal to constituents in the first place, especially if (as I think) it is the truthmaker account, rather than any form of constituent account, that represents the actual views of

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<sup>32</sup> Since I am primarily concerned in what follows only with affirmative (atomic) predications whose logical structure is perspicuously represented as of the form “*a* is *F*”, my statement of TA ignores the difficulty associated with claims such as “Socrates is blind” and “A chimera is non-real”, whose logical structure seems to be more accurately represented as of the form “*a* is not *F*” and “there are no *F*s”. Claims of the latter sort, however, are often thought to be the undoing of truthmaker theory, since the only candidate truthmakers for them appear to be negative facts like *a*'s *not being F* and *there not being any F*s. Appealing to negative facts, however, strikes many as extremely implausible. As David Lewis (1999, 204) says: “It seems, offhand, that [such claims] are true not because things of some kind *do* exist, but rather because counterexamples *don't* exist.” It is important to note, however, that it is possible to take account of these and other related difficulties in a way that preserves at least the spirit of truthmaker theory, by modifying TA as follows. First, we divide all (atomic) predications into two sorts: (A) those (like ‘there are no *F*s’) whose candidate truthmakers are negative facts (e.g., *there not being any F*s) but whose denials (‘there are *F*s’) are such that the candidate truthmakers for them are not negative facts but entities of some kind (namely, one or more *F*s); and (B) those (like ‘*a* is *F*’) whose candidate truthmakers are entities of some kind (say, the individual *a*, or a non-transferable trope of *F*-ness, or the fact that *a* is *F*) but whose denials (‘*a* is not *F*’) are such that the only candidate truthmakers for them are negative facts (*a*'s *not being F*). With this division in mind, we could then say that A-type predications will be true just in case there is no truthmaker for their negation and that B-type predications will be true just in case they have a truthmaker. In line with this, TA could then be revised as follows:

(TA\*): If a predication *p* whose surface grammatical structure is of the form “*a* is *F*” is true, then either (i) *p*'s truth can be explained in terms of a truthmaker—namely, *a*'s *F*-ness, or (ii) the falsity of *p*'s negation can be explained in terms of the absence of such a truthmaker.

As should be clear, on the theory of abstract reference implied by TA\*, expressions of the form ‘*a*'s *F*-ness’ are genuinely referring devices *only when* they correspond to A-type predications. For further development and defense of this sort of truthmaker theory (without concern for the theory of abstract reference implied by it), see Bigelow 1998, 128-134 and Lewis 2001.

medievals such as Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas on predication and abstract reference.<sup>33</sup>

We have now arrived at what I take to be the only type of interpretation that can succeed in making sense of divine simplicity—namely, the truthmaker interpretation. I have yet, however, to say anything substantive about the notion of a truthmaker itself. No doubt, the notion will already be familiar to most readers, being a respected part of much contemporary metaphysics. Even so, a few comments about it would seem to be in order.

In spite of the misleading connotations suggested by its name, the notion of a truthmaker is *not* to be understood in terms of (efficient) causality. On the contrary, it is to be understood in terms of broadly logical entailment—as is evident from the fact that contemporary philosophers habitually speak of truthmakers as *entailing* the truth of certain statements or predications.<sup>34</sup> Although this way of speaking strikes me as perfectly acceptable, it is sometimes objected to on the grounds that only truths (or truthbearers) can entail one another. To remove any possibility for misunderstanding, therefore, I offer the following (partial) analysis of truthmaker in its place:

(TM): If an entity *E* is a truthmaker for a predication *P*, then *E* is necessarily (or essentially) such that *P*.<sup>35</sup>

In line with TM, we may speak of the relationship between a particular truthmaker and the predication it makes true in terms of necessitation rather than entailment. Here again,

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<sup>33</sup> The suggestion that the medievals accept a truthmaker theory of predication is not original to me, but is explicitly defended in Fox 1987. Unlike Fox, however, I am inclined to think that explicit reflection on negative statements (such as ‘There are no chimeræ’), as well as statements involving privations (such as ‘Homer is blind’), lead them to favor a view like TA\* over TA. See previous note.

<sup>34</sup> See, e.g., Armstrong 1997, 13; Bigelow 1998, 125.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Bigelow 1988, 126; Fox 1987, 188; Oliver 1996, 69; and Rodrigue-Pereyra 2000, 260.

however, it must be kept in mind that the necessitation in question is not causal but broadly logical.

It is important to note that TM is intended to provide only a *partial* analysis of the notion of truthmaking. This point is important because a complete analysis of truthmaking in terms of entailment or necessitation would lead to obvious absurdities, including the absurdity that necessary truths—such as “ $2 + 2 = 4$ ”—can have any existing thing whatsoever as their truthmakers. But if TM does not provide a complete analysis of the notion of truthmaking, the question arises: What, in addition to entailment or necessitation, is required for something to qualify as a truthmaker? This is a difficult question, one to which different answers have been given in the literature. Some, such as Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002), claim that the notion of a truthmaker is primitive, and hence does not admit of non-circular analysis or definition.<sup>36</sup> Others, however, attempt to define truthmaker in terms of more familiar notions. Thus, Greg Restall (1996) suggests that we can define truthmaking in terms of the notion of non-classical or “relevant” entailment.<sup>37</sup> Again, Barry Smith (1999 and 2002) claims that we can define it in terms of *representation* or *projection*, a notion that he describes as the dual of necessitation.<sup>38</sup> Fortunately, we needn’t decide here among the competing accounts. For

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<sup>36</sup> Thus, according to Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002, 34), the best we can do is to say that an entity *E* is a truthmaker for a predication *P* if and only if *E* is an entity *in virtue of which* *P* is true, and then illustrate what we mean by ‘being true in virtue of’ with examples.

<sup>37</sup> According to Restall (1996, 339), an entity *E* is a truthmaker for a predication *P* if and only if *E* *really* entails (or is *really* necessarily such) that *P*, where he suggests that ‘real entailment (or necessity)’ is to be understood along the lines of Anderson and Belnap’s notion of relevant entailment. Rather surprisingly, however, when Restall actually states his account of real entailment, he explicitly defines it in terms of truthmakers: *A* really entails *B*, he says, if and only if, in every world *W*, every truthmaker for *A* is a truthmaker for *B*. Obviously, this account of non-classical entailment won’t do as a *reductive* analysis of the notion of truthmaking.

<sup>38</sup> Smith’s definition of truthmaking can be characterized succinctly as follows (cf. Smith 2002, 232): an entity *E* is a truthmaker for a predication *P* if and only if *E* is necessarily such that it is a part of the total projection of *P*, where ‘the total projection of *P*’ is to be understood as ‘the sum of all those entities projected by *P*’ and an entity *E* is projected by *P* just in case both *P* and *P* entails that *E* exists.

our purposes, it will suffice merely to adopt the following principle: if an entity *E* necessitates the truth of a predication *P*, then *E* is at least a candidate—perhaps even a *prima facie* good candidate—for *P*'s truthmaker.

It should be clear, in light of the foregoing, that to characterize an entity as a truthmaker is to characterize it in terms of a certain metaphysical function or role—that of necessitating (in a certain way) the truth of the predications it makes true. In this respect, 'truthmaker' is similar to other sorts of functional characterization one finds in philosophy. Just as functional characterizations in the philosophy of mind, for example, enable us to prescind from the precise nature of mental states (such as pain), so too the characterization of an entity as a truthmaker enables us to prescind from the precise ontological category to which it belongs.

All of this is, of course, directly relevant to the doctrine of divine simplicity. Insofar as the doctrine requires us to identify God with *his nature, goodness, power, justice*, and so on, it must be interpreted in light of a theory of predication and abstract reference that permits the referents of abstract expressions of the form '*a*'s *F*-ness' to refer to entities belonging to the category of *concrete particular* (namely, God himself). Given what we have said about truthmakers, however, we can see that TA is just such a theory. In taking the referents of abstract expressions to be truthmakers, it places no restriction whatsoever on the nature or ontological category to which they belong. For the same reason, the referents of such expressions can, at least in principle, be identified not only with concrete particulars in the case of God, but also with properties in the case of creatures.

#### 4. The Truthmaker Interpretation Defended

If my argument to this point has been successful, it will be clear that the truthmaker interpretation of simplicity provides us with an account of the doctrine that is *prima facie* coherent. In this final section, I complete my defense of the truthmaker interpretation by arguing for two further claims: first, that in addition to being coherent, the truthmaker interpretation is actually quite plausible in certain respects; and second, that the truthmaker interpretation is the only coherent—and hence the only plausible—interpretation of simplicity possible.

*4.1 The Truthmaker Interpretation as Plausible.* According to the truthmaker interpretation, God is identical to the truthmakers for each of the true (intrinsic) predications that can be made about him. Thus, if God is divine, he is identical with that which makes him divine; if he is good, he is identical with that which makes him good; and so on in every other such case. Now, since nothing can be regarded as identical with anything other than itself, this interpretation just amounts to the claim that God *is* the truthmaker for each of the predications in question.

As already indicated, this interpretation avoids the absurdities associated with the standard contemporary interpretations of simplicity: it neither requires the identification of God with anything belonging to an ontological category incompatible with that to which he in fact belongs (namely, *concrete particular*), nor rules out the possibility that abstract expressions refer to properties in the case of creatures. In addition to avoiding these absurdities, however, it also appears to render the doctrine itself quite plausible in

certain ways. In order to see why, we need to examine the sorts of predications that can be made about God.

Consider first the statement “God is divine”. Like any other statement involving the predication of a thing’s nature to the thing itself, “God is divine” is a case of essential predication: in all possible worlds in which God exists, he is divine. It follows, therefore, that God himself is such that, necessarily, if he exists, he is divine—that is to say, that God himself necessitates the truth of “God is divine”. As we have seen, however, this is sufficient to make God himself a candidate for the truthmaker of “God is divine”. Indeed, as John Bigelow (1988, 128) notes, it is natural for philosophers who accept the truthmaker account to endorse the view that individuals are always the truthmakers for the essential predications that can be made about them.<sup>39</sup>

Now as it turns out, what can be said about “God is divine” applies to other divine predications. According to classical theism, God is not only good, but essentially good (or omnibenevolent); likewise, he is not only powerful, but also essentially powerful (or omnipotent). Indeed, classical theism requires that all (intrinsic) predications of the form “God is *F*” are cases of essential predication.<sup>40</sup> But if that is correct, then God is a plausible candidate for every (intrinsic) divine predication, which is precisely what the doctrine of divine simplicity requires on the truthmaker interpretation. Of course, this aspect of classical theism is controversial and difficult to square with other aspects of

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<sup>39</sup> Such philosophers standardly assume that distinct predications can be made true by the same truthmaker—so that, for example, “Socrates is human”, “Socrates is an animal”, and “Socrates is human or the moon is made of green cheese” can all have the same truthmaker (namely, Socrates), despite the fact they differ in meaning and logical form. This assumption is not trivial (see the objections in Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, 43-46); nonetheless, I shall take it for granted, since it is part-and-parcel of truthmaker theory as it is often understood, and of much contemporary work in metaphysics. For discussion and defense of this assumption, see Armstrong 1978, vol. 2, 7-18, 52-59, and Mulligan, Simons, and Smith 1984, 295-304.

<sup>40</sup> Cf., e.g., Aquinas’s remarks in *Summa Theologiae* Ia, q. 3, a. 6 for the types of considerations motivating this aspect of classical theism.

traditional theism, which appear to imply that God has intrinsic accidental properties (say, in virtue of freely choosing to do certain things). My point, however, is not that we should *accept* the claim that all (intrinsic) predications of the form “God is *F*” are cases of essential predication, but rather that *if* we accept this, then the doctrine of divine simplicity becomes quite attractive in certain ways.

*4.2 Objections and Replies.* There are no doubt a number of objections that might be raised to the truthmaker interpretation of simplicity. Here I want to focus on just two, both of which concern TA, the account of predication and abstract reference underlying it.

*Objection 1:* I have claimed that TA is a categorially neutral account of predication and abstract reference, and hence that in principle it places no restriction on the nature of the referents of expressions of the form ‘*a*’s *F*-ness’. Moreover, I have argued that these referents can be plausibly identified with concrete particulars—indeed, God himself—in the case of God. But is it really plausible to say that the referents of such expressions can also be identified with properties in the case of creatures, as the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity requires?

Yes, provided we have the right conception of properties. What makes it plausible to say that (e.g.) ‘God’s justice’ refers to God himself is that the referent of this expression, on TA, is the truthmaker for a case of *essential* predication, “God is just”. Notice, however, that in the case of creatures, the same sort of expression, (e.g.) ‘Socrates’s justice’, will typically refer to the truthmaker for a case of accidental or *contingent* predication. In that case, however, it will not be plausible to say that the

referent of the expression is a concrete individual. Socrates, for example, cannot be regarded as the truthmaker for “Socrates is just”, since Socrates does not necessitate its truth. But then what is the truthmaker in such cases? As it turns out, there is more than one way to answer this question. David Armstrong, for example, has argued that the truthmakers for contingent predications must be regarded as facts (or concrete states of affairs).<sup>41</sup> On this view, the referent for an expression such as ‘Socrates’s justice’, understood as a device for picking out the truthmaker of “Socrates is just”, will be the *fact that Socrates is wise*. Obviously this answer will be of no use to the defender of simplicity, since as we have seen facts (or concrete states of affairs) are complex. But this is not the only answer that can be given. One can also argue, as C. B. Martin does, that the truthmakers for contingent predications are non-transferable tropes—that is, concrete individual properties that are essentially dependent on the subjects of which they are the properties.<sup>42</sup> This sort of trope nominalism seems to me to represent the view of properties most commonly endorsed by medieval philosophers.<sup>43</sup> If I am right about this, however, then the referent of ‘Socrates’s justice’ *can* be identified with a property—one such that, in all possible worlds in which it exists, Socrates exists and is just—despite the

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<sup>41</sup> See Armstrong 1989 and 1997.

<sup>42</sup> See Armstrong 1989, esp. 116-119. For a more complete development and defense of this view, see Mulligan, Simons, and Smith 1989.

<sup>43</sup> Cf., e.g., the following remarks of Aquinas:

It is not necessary that if *this* is a man and *that* is a man, then they both have numerically the same humanity, any more than two white things have numerically the same whiteness; but it is necessary that the one be similar to the other in that it has a humanity just as the other does. It is for this reason that the intellect, considering humanity not as belonging to this thing, but as humanity, forms a concept that is common to all. (*Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* II, d. 17, q.1, a.1)

fact that ‘God’s justice’ must be identified with a concrete particular (namely, God himself).<sup>44</sup>

*Objection 2:* Even if it is true in principle, on TA, that expressions of the form ‘*a*’s *F*-ness’ can be taken to refer to entities in different ontological categories (including properties and concrete particulars), it still seems problematic that divine simplicity requires specific instances of this type of expression, say ‘*a*’s justice’, to refer to entities of such radically different kinds as non-transferable tropes in one context (namely, ‘Socrates’s justice’), and concrete particulars in another (namely, ‘God’s goodness’). After all, predications of the form “*a* is good” seem to have the same basic meaning regardless of whether ‘*a*’ refers to Socrates or to God.

There are three things to be said in response to this objection. First, it must be emphasized that from the perspective of the truthmaker account, the form or syntactical type of an expression such as ‘*a*’s justice’ is irrelevant to the specific ontological category of its referent. According to TA, an expression such as ‘*a*’s justice’ is a technical term whose referent is *stipulated* as being whatever it is that makes true its corresponding predications (in this case, ‘*a* is just’). In principle, therefore, there is nothing about the form or syntactical type of such an expression to rule out the possibility of its referring to accidental properties or tropes in one case, and to concrete particulars in another—provided, of course, that both of these types of entity can plausibly be regarded as playing the role of truthmaker the relevant type of predication.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> If it is asked in virtue of what Socrates’s justice and God’s justice (or better, God himself) resemble, the answer will be of the same general sort that is usually offered by trope-nominalists. Just in virtue of being the concrete individuals they are, they resemble. End of story

<sup>45</sup> Cf. *Summa Theologiae* Ia, q. 13, aa. 4-5, where the fact that such different types of entity can plausibly be said to play this role leads Aquinas to conclude that predicates such as ‘just’ apply to God and creatures only *analogously*.

The second thing to be said is that there are examples, most of them admittedly controversial, in which it is not implausible to say that an expression of a single syntactical type refers to both accidental tropes and concrete particulars. To give a standard medieval example, suppose we have a kettle of hot water boiling over an open fire. In that case, each of the following predications will be true:

(4) The water is hot.

(5) The fire is hot.

Now provided that we are willing to grant the possibility that both fire and water are substances, then claim 4 may be regarded as a case of accidental predication, and hence as requiring an accidental trope for its truthmaker, whereas claim 5 may be regarded as a case of essential predication, and hence as requiring only a particular substance, the fire, for its truthmaker. But, then, if we follow TA in inventing abstract nominalizations for their truthmakers, then in the case of claims 4 and 5 we will end up with expressions of a single syntactical type, namely, '*a*'s heat', which will refer to entities in both the relevant ontological categories. Moreover, since these entities play the same functional role—that of explaining why something is hot—despite their being of different categories, they are rightly said to belong to the same (functional) kind, *heat*, and hence to serve as the referents for the same type of expression.

Third and finally, it must be said that if we attend to the substantive conception of metaphysical kinds standardly adopted by medieval philosophers, the idea that the *F*-ness of different things (such as Socrates's justice and God's justice) are categorially different in certain cases no longer appears so problematic. According to Aquinas, for example, kinds are to be understood in broadly functional terms: things belong to the metaphysical kinds they do in virtue of possessing certain powers or capacities (namely, those that are

definitive of their kind). In fact, a thing's *nature*, as he understands it, just is that which grounds its kind-defining powers or capacities.<sup>46</sup> Now in the case of a creature such as Socrates, whose justice can clearly wax and wane, it is one thing to be human, and another thing to be just. Thus, Socrates cannot be just solely in virtue of possessing human nature, and hence the distinctive capacities associated with the metaphysical kind *human being*. On the contrary, in order for him to be just, he must come to actualize his distinctively human capacities, which will require on his part the acquisition of certain contingent properties or non-transferable tropes—say, knowledge and virtue. In the case of God, by contrast, things are different. For unlike humanity, God's nature, as Aquinas sees it, is such that its very possession necessitates the actualization of the capacities specific to it—which include the capacities for being perfectly just, powerful, good, knowledgeable, wise, and so on. Hence, solely in virtue of possessing his nature, God will not only be just, but also omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly just, wise, and so on.<sup>47</sup>

In the end, therefore, there appears to nothing incoherent about saying that both God and creatures are just, despite the fact that God is identical with his justice, whereas creatures are distinct from and only accidentally related to theirs. No doubt, there are other objections that could be raised to the truthmaker account, and hence to the interpretation of simplicity that relies on it. But since these are, at least as far as I can tell, the most powerful and obvious ones—apart from those that can be raised against truthmaker theory itself, whose coherence I am taking for granted in this paper<sup>48</sup>—I

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<sup>46</sup> See MacDonald 1990 for texts and discussion of Aquinas's account of metaphysical kinds.

<sup>47</sup> These sorts of considerations lead Aquinas to say that, strictly speaking, there is no potentiality in God, but only actuality.

<sup>48</sup> Apart from the question whether a single individual can make true distinct predications (cf. note 40 above), the main threat to truthmaker theory comes from the so-called *Slingshot argument*, which purports to establish the emptiness or uselessness of the notion of truthmaking. For a response to this argument on behalf of truthmakers, see Rodriguez-Pereyra 2001.

conclude that the truthmaker interpretation of simplicity is not only coherent, but also quite plausible in a number of respects.

*4.3 The Only Coherent Interpretation?* I have now completed my defense of the truthmaker interpretation of divine simplicity. Before concluding, however, I want to indicate briefly why, in addition to making sense of the doctrine, the interpretation that I have defended also seems to offer the *only* possible way of rendering it intelligible.

All the interpretations of simplicity that we have examined other than the truthmaker interpretation fail because they rely on the wrong account of predication and abstract reference. From the failure of the property and states-of-affairs interpretations we learn that the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity cannot be made sense of apart from a *categorially neutral* account of predication and abstract reference. From the failure of the constituent interpretation, however, we learn that category neutrality is not sufficient to make sense of the doctrine. What is needed is an account that is both *thin* enough to preserve the categorial neutrality of referents of expressions of the form ‘*a*’s *F*-ness’, while at the same time *thick* enough to enable us to distinguish such referents when they are either in fact distinct (as in the case of *Socrates’s nature* and *Socrates’s goodness*) or merely conceptually distinct (as in the case of *God’s nature* and *God’s goodness*). That is to say, what is needed is a general theory of predication and abstract reference that meets each of the following conditions:

(C1): True (intrinsic) predications of the form “*a* is *F*” entail the existence of entities (such as *God’s justice* or *Socrates’s justice*) that can be referred to by abstract expressions of the form ‘*a*’s *F*-ness’.

(C2): The entities referred to by such expressions are of a type whose instances can plausibly be both (i) identified with concrete particulars (as in the case of *God’s justice*) and properties (as in the case of *Socrates’s justice*); and (ii) distinguished (at least conceptually) from one another.

Truthmakers, however, appear to be the only type of entity that obviously meets both of these conditions. We can, if we choose, appeal to such entities directly, as in the case of the truthmaker interpretation of simplicity, or we can appeal to them indirectly, as in the case of the revised constituent interpretation. But either way, it appears that we have no choice but to appeal to them.

I conclude, therefore, that the truthmaker interpretation is not only *sufficient* for making sense of divine simplicity, but also *necessary*. Those who remain unconvinced may take the arguments of this paper as a challenge either to identify the source of incoherence in the truthmaker interpretation, or to provide a counterexample to my claim that it is the only coherent interpretation of simplicity that can be given.

*4.4 Conclusion.* In this paper, I have argued that the doctrine of divine simplicity makes sense if—and apparently only if—we are prepared to interpret it in terms of a truthmaker account of predication. For only interpreted in this way can it meet C1 and C2, the two conditions necessary for any coherent interpretation of simplicity. I have also argued, however, that once we interpret the doctrine in terms of a truthmaker account, it turns out to be not only coherent, but also quite plausible, at least given certain assumptions of classical theism.

If my arguments have been successful, we have, at long last, a way of resolving the contemporary difficulties with divine simplicity. For in that case, the difficulties will trace not (as Wolterstorff's interpretation suggests) to any fundamental disagreement about whether properties are constituents, but rather (as mine suggests) to a fundamental disagreement about the ontological commitments of predication and abstract reference.

Thus, if contemporary philosophers want to understand the doctrine of divine simplicity, they need only enter imaginatively into that theoretical account according to which the entities required for the truth of predications and for the referents of their corresponding abstract expressions are truthmakers. However, once we have entered this framework—and I don't think this requires *too* much imagination, given the centrality of the notion of truthmaker in much contemporary metaphysics—it turns out that we are in a position not only to appreciate the coherence and the plausibility of the doctrine of divine simplicity, but also a good bit of medieval metaphysics and philosophy of language as well.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> [Acknowledgements]

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