

## **Divine Foreknowledge: Two Accounts**

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### **Introduction**

One of the more hotly debated topics in evangelical circles today is that of divine foreknowledge. Many Christians find it difficult to see why holding a particular view on this topic is all that important. However, those who have looked into this issue understand that the view one holds of God's foreknowledge has implications that reach into almost every facet of theology.

The most popular and heated discussion involving divine foreknowledge surrounds the issue of the relation between divine foreknowledge and human free will. This paper will outline two views of God's foreknowledge. Special focus will be given to two issues in the debate. One issue deals with the supposed incompatibility of foreknowledge and free will. The other issue asks whether or not God has dependent knowledge.

The views to be discussed are as follows:

1. The Molinism of William Lane Craig
2. The Thomistic view of divine foreknowledge

### **The Problem of Foreknowledge**

Before beginning the discussion, it will be beneficial to highlight some of the problems these views are trying to alleviate. The first problem is that of necessary knowledge and free will. If God knows all future events infallibly, then He cannot be wrong about what will happen. If God cannot be wrong about what will happen, it seems we are determined to do the things God knows that we will do. For if we did that which

God knew we would not do, then God would not have known infallibly. But this is to deny God's omniscience. Since God is omniscient, we are determined to act in accordance with His knowledge. This immediately brings into question the reality of human free will.

The second problem is that of dependency. Is God informed by what will happen, or does God know reality by means of Himself? In other words, does God know something is going to happen because He sees it happening in reality, or does He know it because He caused it? If God knows something because He caused it, it would seem to follow that creatures do not have free will. If, on the other hand, God knows what will happen because He sees it happen, then it seems that God has dependent knowledge. If God has dependent knowledge, it seems that God has learned something that He did not already know "before" creation. If God learned something, it would follow that He is not omniscient, since an omniscient being knows everything.

### **Molinism**

Molinism holds that God's knowledge has a particular structure. Understanding this structure offers a conceptual framework to guide ones thinking about God's knowledge of the future. Our knowledge is structured such that we learn over a period of time. God, on the other hand, does not arrive at conclusions in a chronological order. God does not, for example, come to know that George Bush will be re-elected after He knew that Moses lead his people out of the land of Egypt.

Since God can know everything in one temporal moment, another sort of distinction must be made in order to understand the different aspects of God's knowledge. Dr. Craig proposes that we understand the "moments" in God's knowledge as

logical moments rather than temporal moments. As he explains in his book *The Only Wise God*, “To say that something is logically prior to something else is not to say that the one occurs before the other in time. Temporally, they could be simultaneous. Rather, logical priority means that something serves to explain something else. The one provides the grounds or basis for the other.”<sup>1</sup>

Another important point about logical priority needs to be made. Dr. Craig states that “future events are logically prior to the truth or falsity of statements about them, since these statements are true or false on the basis of how the events turn out.”<sup>2</sup> For example, the statement ‘My wife will eat chicken for breakfast tomorrow morning’ is dependent on the contingent event of my wife choosing to eat chicken tomorrow morning. The statement about the future is only true if the event actually comes to pass. Hence, the basis for the truth of the claim ‘My wife will eat chicken for breakfast tomorrow morning’ is *temporally* subsequent to the statement, but *logically* prior to the statement.

How then is God’s knowledge structured? It is ordered into three distinct logical moments. The first moment of God’s knowledge is called natural knowledge. This moment is when God has knowledge of all necessary and possible truths. Necessary truths are those truths that must be the case in all possible worlds. For example, “ $2+2=4$ ” and “A is not non-A” are necessarily true in all possible worlds. In addition to necessary truths, God knows everything that is logically possible. He knows every possible

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<sup>1</sup> William Lane Craig, *The Only Wise God* (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1999), 127.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 128.

combination of causes and effects. This knowledge does not depend on God's willing anything to come about; rather it is a part of the nature of God. God could not lack this knowledge and still be God.

The second moment is called middle knowledge. Middle knowledge is "God's knowledge of what every possible free creature would do under any possible set of circumstances."<sup>3</sup> For example, God knows that under condition A (which includes all conditions from the past up to the present), Hector would choose to drink sweet tea. God also knows that given condition B, Hector would not choose to drink sweet tea. In this way, God knows what creatures would freely do.

A fundamental point should be made about this position. In this moment, God does not simply know what free creatures *could* do in any given set of circumstances; He knows what they *would* do. By knowing what free creature would do in any given set of circumstances, middle knowledge narrows the scope of possible worlds to only those worlds that are feasible. Many possible worlds are not feasible in that a free creature would not choose a particular action given certain circumstances. God bases His choice to create on this knowledge. God selects, from all feasible worlds, the one which He wants to create.

Furthermore, middle knowledge is knowledge of all true counterfactuals. Counterfactual statements are hypothetical statements about what would happen. Consider the following example: 'If Hitler had been killed in his youth, the holocaust would have never taken place.' God's middle knowledge knows this sort of claim to be true, if in fact that the holocaust would not have taken place. If this is merely a possible

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 131.

outcome of Hitler's death, but not something that would actually be the case if Hitler died, then this statement would be located in God's natural knowledge. However, if the holocaust were to really be averted by Hitler's early death, this statement would be included in God's middle knowledge.

The third moment is called free knowledge. Free knowledge is God's "knowledge of the actual world which He has created. This includes His foreknowledge of everything that will happen."<sup>4</sup> In this moment all possibilities that will not actually happen are ruled out. Neither middle knowledge nor free knowledge is essential to God's nature. While God has to have this *kind* of knowledge to be God, the *content* of this knowledge could be different if free creatures would in fact choose differently.

In summary, the three moments of God's knowledge are as follows:

1. Natural knowledge – knowledge of necessary truths and all logical possibilities
2. Middle knowledge – counterfactual knowledge of all feasible worlds
3. Free knowledge – knowledge of the actual world as it is

In addition to the structure of God's knowledge, it is important to discuss the location of God's decree to create the world. Does God's decree occur between natural and middle knowledge? Or does it occur between middle and free knowledge? One view holds that God's decree is logically prior to His middle knowledge. According to Craig this view "maintained that in decreeing that a particular world exist, God also decreed which counterfactual statements are true. Logically prior to the divine decree, there are

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 129.

no counterfactual truths to be known.”<sup>5</sup> Placing the divine decree here implies that God determined all true counterfactuals.

The Molinist response to placing God’s decree prior to His middle knowledge is to argue that this move eliminates free will. If God decreed all counterfactual truths from eternity, then He would be the cause of all free actions. God would not merely be determining the circumstances in which people would be placed; rather, He would determine what people *would do* in those circumstances. According to Dr. Craig, this would annihilate free will.<sup>6</sup>

In response to this problem the Molinist places God’s creative decree after God’s middle knowledge. In this way they hoped to avoid the problem of theological fatalism. If God’s decree were based on His middle knowledge, His middle knowledge would not be the result of God’s will but the result of God’s knowing what free creatures would actually do in a given set of circumstances.

The Molinist can further his argument by pointing out that God had something on which to base His creative act. He appears to alleviate the problem of how God can be omniscient and people can be free, but he also argues that Molinism helps to explain how God can bring about His ultimate purposes on earth. God, knowing all true counterfactuals, is able to choose among the myriad of feasible worlds to bring about His will.

The Bible appears to support the Molinist claim that God knows counterfactuals. 1 Samuel 23:1-13 speaks of God forewarning David. David asks God what would happen

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<sup>5</sup> James K. Beilby,; Eddy, Paul R., *Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views*. (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001.), 121.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 122.

if he were to stay in Keilah. The response was, if David were to stay in Keilah, he would have been handed over to Saul. Hence God knew a counterfactual of freedom, namely what would have happened if David followed a particular course of action. This is a situation where God's knowledge of counterfactual truths averted the demise of David. In Matthew 17:27 Jesus gives Peter instructions to pay the temple tax with a coin that came from the mouth of a fish that he would catch. The instructions of Jesus would be true if Peter were to carry out these instructions. Here again is an example of God knowing what would happen given certain conditions.

### **Evaluation of Molinism**

The first objection to the Molinist position is called the grounding objection. The grounding objection tries to show that there is no ontological grounding for the truth of counterfactuals of freedom. The question is this: What, in reality, is the ground for the truth of the claim, "If Hitler were to die in his youth, the holocaust would have been averted"? The grounding objection then is not an epistemological question. It is not asking how God knows counterfactuals. It is asking about the ontological grounding for such counterfactual truth claims. It asks, What makes a counterfactual statement true?<sup>7</sup>

One possible ground for the truth of counterfactual statements might be found in the combination of psychological factors, the character of the individual, and the circumstances surrounding the individual. God would only need to know these factors in order to know what free creatures would do. God can then manipulate these factors, without violating free will, to accomplish His will in the created order. Craig, however,

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<sup>7</sup> William Hasker, *God, Time, and Knowledge*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 29.

denies that God knows future contingents by means of His knowledge of these factors. What then can be the basis for the truth of these counterfactual statements?

Craig holds that God's knowledge of future-tensed statements "is based on logically prior statements which He knows and which enable Him to know the truth of future-tense statements."<sup>8</sup> It would appear then that God's middle knowledge is dependent on His natural knowledge. In some way, God's knowledge of counterfactuals is based on other knowledge that God has. Dr. Craig denies what is called the "perceptualist" model of foreknowledge because it makes middle knowledge dependent on God's "seeing" the future.<sup>9</sup> According to that model, God knows what is going to happen because He "sees" what is going to take place.

Rather, Craig holds to a "conceptualist" model of foreknowledge.<sup>10</sup> According to this view, God has the essential property of knowing all truths. Craig writes, "God's knowledge is self-contained; it is ... like a mind's knowledge of innate ideas."<sup>11</sup> In this way, Craig denies that God's knowledge is dependent on the world.



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<sup>8</sup> Craig, *The Only Wise God*, 122.

<sup>9</sup> Beilby & Eddy, *Divine Foreknowledge*, 133.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 133.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 133.



Since Craig does not believe that God knows things by “looking out” to see what happens, it is more than a bit odd for him to use the examples he does. His examples seem to indicate that counterfactuals are known by an individual's character, psychological makeup, and circumstances. For example, in *The Only Wise God* Craig responds to the claim that counterfactuals do not have any truth-value. He claims that we commonly use counterfactual statements in our daily experience. His examples are, “If I knew you were coming, I would have baked a cake”; and “If Richard Nixon were

smarter, he would have destroyed the tapes.”<sup>12</sup> Clearly these are the kinds of things that we would predict based on one's knowledge of the circumstances, the character of the individual, and an individual's self-knowledge. What purpose then, do these examples serve? *Human* predictions about what would happen are not infallible, and Craig admits that God does not know by these means. It is unclear then how these examples serve as good illustrations of how God knows the truth-value of counterfactual statements.

If God does not know by psychological and circumstantial means, the basis for His knowledge is still very unclear. The logic seems to run:

1. Counterfactual statements can be true or false.
2. God knows all true statements and no false statements.
3. Therefore, God knows all true counterfactual statements.

Craig argues that there must be at least some true counterfactuals. If one makes the claim, ‘John will either scratch his head or not scratch his head,’ this statement must be true because it exhausts all logical possibilities. If John exists, John either will scratch his head, or he will not scratch his head. In this way Craig hopes to show that at least some counterfactual statements have truth-value. This would be an example of an analytically true statement, which unfortunately for Craig, is simply a tautology.

However, if he is to have a tenable view, he must show that there are some true non-tautological counterfactual statements. Middle knowledge requires more than mere tautologies. God's knowledge that triangles are three sided geometrical figures does not inform Him of the existence of an actual triangle. In the same way, God's knowledge that

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<sup>12</sup> Craig, *The Only Wise God*, 139.

‘John either will or will not scratch his head’ does not provide a basis for the true belief that ‘John will scratch his head.’

Even if Craig can show that some counterfactuals are true, it does not follow that all counterfactuals have a truth-value. But this is the very thing that is required of Molinism if it is to be an informative view! The Molinist is not interested in arguing that God knows all “true” tautologies. For the Molinist, counterfactual knowledge is knowledge of what free creatures *would* do in any given circumstance. Unless there is some reason to believe that non-tautological counterfactual statements are true, it would appear that Molinism is still left without an ontological grounding.

Finally, it can be argued that the Molinist position actually destroys free will. First, Molinists continually make reference to the circumstances a free creature finds himself in, as though the circumstances themselves are casually determinative of the act. The Molinist needs to make clear the connection between circumstances and free actions. If the circumstances are causally determinative of the free act, then the creature does not have free will. (At least not in any relevant libertarian sense.) If the circumstances are not determinative, how is it meaningful to speak of what a free creature would do in some given set of circumstances?<sup>13</sup>

Second, it can be argued that the Molinist understands the free will of God and the free will of man to be univocal. The Thomistic response is that God’s free will ought to be understood as analogous to man’s free will. The Thomist and the Molinist ought to agree that God is completely free. His freedom is unlimited while human free will is limited. His free will exists even if nothing else exists. Man’s free will exists because He

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<sup>13</sup> Hasker, 24.

gives it to him. On this, there should be no disagreement. By removing God as the primary efficient cause of human action, the Molinist undermines his explanation for the existence of free will.

In other words, the Thomist argues that God continually actualizes man's free will. If He were to remove Himself as the cause of human actions, free will would no longer exist. For the Molinist, it is absurd to talk of God causing free will. For the Thomist, it is absurd to deny God's causal relation to man's actions because that is the very thing that makes us free! Garrigou-Lagrange says of Molinism, "It seeks to define human liberty without any reference to the object that specifies the free act."<sup>14</sup> But to speak of free will in this way takes away a meaningful explanation for the existence of free will.

### **Thomistic Foreknowledge**

The Thomistic view of divine foreknowledge flows from Aquinas' view of God. According to Aquinas, God is a simple being. There are certain things that must be true of God if God is a simple being. For example, God's existence and His essence are identical. He must not have accidents. In other words, there must not be any non-essential aspects to God. Concerning knowledge then, the Thomistic view holds that His knowledge is essential. It is not possible for a simple being to gain new knowledge. Likewise, it is impossible for a simple being to forget. According to this view, God does not *have* knowledge; rather, God *is* knowledge. His knowledge never changes. In book one of his *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Thomas Aquinas comments on the unchanging nature of God's knowledge:

“If, however, God’s understanding is His being, His understanding must be simple, eternal and unchangeable, existing only in act, and including all the perfections that have been proved of the divine being. Hence, God is not potentially understanding, nor still does He have any change or composition in understanding.”<sup>15</sup>

Since God knows essentially and unchangeably, He cannot have dependent knowledge. If His knowledge were dependent on something external to Him, God would then have the ability to learn something, which is impossible. Furthermore, if God knew according to something external to Him, something would be added to His essence. The necessary implications of God knowing by way of something external to Himself would be that God has passive potency, and that God’s knowledge is accidental. Aquinas clearly disagrees with any notion of passive potency in God or any accidental knowledge in God.

“...the intellect becomes understanding in act through an intelligible species, just as the sense becomes sensing in act through a sensible species. The intelligible species is to the intellect, therefore, as act to potency. If, then, the divine intellect understood through some intelligible species other than itself, it would be in potency with respect to something. This is impossible, as we proved above. Moreover, an intelligible species in the intellect that is other than the intellect’s essence has an accidental being, which is why our knowledge is numbered among the accidents. But in God, as we have shown, there can be no accident. Therefore, there is not in the divine intellect any species other than the divine essence itself.”<sup>16</sup>

Since God, being pure act, cannot know something by way of anything else, He must know everything by knowing Himself as the cause of all other things. God knows everything that He could possibly do. God, knowing Himself perfectly, knows what He *could* bring about and what He *would* bring about. God is related to the world as its

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<sup>14</sup> Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, *Predestination*, (Rockford, IL: Tan Books and Publishers, INC., 1939), 320.

<sup>15</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles: Book One: God*, (United States: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955.), 174.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 175.

primary efficient sustaining cause. Hence He knows perfectly and particularly all that *can* and all that *will* happen.

God's knowledge of reality, whether past, present or future, is known to Him directly. God does not passively sit back and "watch" what free creatures do in any given circumstance. Further, God does not have a kind of *a priori* knowledge of what free creatures would do in any given situation. God knows all of created reality because He is the cause of all created reality. As Aquinas says, "An effect is adequately known when its cause is known."<sup>17</sup> As the primary efficient cause of everything, God knows exactly what He will do. Hence God knows exactly what we will do.

According to the Thomistic view, God does not have middle knowledge. God has knowledge of all things possible and all things actual. God has what is called "simple intelligence" and "knowledge of approbation." Simple intelligence presupposes no divine decree. It is knowledge of all things possible for God to do. Knowledge of approbation is God's knowledge of all that is real and good in the created world.<sup>18</sup> His sovereign decree to create was not based on any prior knowledge; rather, God decided what He would do and then He did it.

### **Possible Objections to the Thomistic View**

Several questions arise when one considers this view. The first question deals with the issue of evil. If God knows everything because He is the cause of all things, does it not follow that God is the cause of evil? Further, if God is not the cause of evil, and if

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<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 180.

<sup>18</sup> Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, *Reality: A Synthesis of Thomistic Thought*. (U.S.A.: B. Herder Book Co., 1950), 99.

God can only know created reality through Himself as the efficient cause, does it not follow that God could not have knowledge of evil? These questions are best answered by Rev. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange when he says,

“[God] knows [evil] by its opposition to the good wherein alone evil can exist. Hence God knows evil by knowing what He permits, what He does not hinder. No evil, physical or moral, can come to be unless, for a higher good, God permits it to be. Knowing what He permits, God knows by that permission all evil that has been, is, or will ever be.”<sup>19</sup>

There appears, however, to be a serious problem with this solution. The initial question asked how it is that God knows evil if He is not the cause of evil. This solution does not appear to speak of whether or not God caused the evil, simply that He knows it by what He permits. Permitting evil sounds like a passive activity. If the permitting of evil is a passive activity, then we appear to be right where we started. For the question still remains, ‘How can God know evil if He did not cause evil?’

A further problem remains. As Aquinas says, “When a good is known, the opposite evil is known. But God knows all particular goods, to which evils are opposed. Therefore, God knows evils.”<sup>20</sup> If this is true, it seems that God knows particular goods as actual, and particular evils as possible. If God is the cause of all that is good, then surely He knows all actual goods because He caused them. But if God permits evil and is not the cause of evil, then how can He know all actual particular evils?

In response, it should be noted that evil is a privation of a good thing. Evil does not exist in its own right; rather it exists as an ontological parasite, so it may be

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 99.

<sup>20</sup> Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles: Book One: Part 1*, 235.

considered a byproduct of a good thing. Hence God can create only good things and cause only good actions, and still know evil as a byproduct of a good act.

Again, God knows all goods to which a creature can attain. For example, He knows exactly what it is that perfects the nature of a human. God knows the degree to which we fall short of this perfection. Therefore God knows evil while being the cause of all good that exists. In this way God can, by knowing Himself, know evil. God causes the very things whose byproduct is evil. In this way He permits evil.

Secondly, God can know particular evils because He has complete knowledge of a thing. God, knowing everything there is to know about a thing, can know particular evils. As Aquinas says,

“By knowing Himself, God knows whatever proceeds from Him immediately. When this is known, God once more knows what proceeds from it immediately; and so on for all intermediate causes down to the last effect. Therefore, God knows whatever is found in reality. But this is to have a proper and complete knowledge of a thing, namely, to know all that there is in that thing, both what is common and what it proper.”<sup>21</sup>

The second problem deals with God’s causal relation to the world and man’s free will. It seems that if God knows everything because He is the cause, then man is left without free will. If God causes everything, then what is left for man to cause? Free will in the libertarian sense requires that man have the power of contrary choice. In other words, given two options, a free creature can actually choose either one. Is God the cause of human actions, or is the human agent the cause of the action? If God is the cause, then it would seem that man does not have free will. If the human agent is the cause of the action, it would seem that God could not know future free actions.

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 182.

From Aquinas' *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book 3, Part II, it is clear that God causes not only the power of the free will, but also the acts of free will. He clearly states that "...we receive not only the power of willing from God, but also the operation."<sup>22</sup> Here Aquinas responds to those who would argue that dual efficient causality is contradictory. He goes on to say,

"God not only gives powers to things but, beyond that, no thing can act by its own power unless it acts through His power... man cannot use the power of will that has been given him except in so far as he acts through the power of God. Now, the being through whose power the agent acts is the cause not only of the power, but also of the act... Therefore, God is for us the cause not only of our will, but also of our act of willing."<sup>23</sup>

It is clear then that not only the power of free will is given us, but the acts of free will are given to us as well. This answers the above question about how God knows future free actions. He is the cause of all future free actions. What, then, does this imply about the power of human free will? It implies that God actualizes human free will. The Thomist will argue that it is not contrary to free will that God be the cause of man's free will; rather, it is necessary for free will that God cause.

Clearly this position needs some fleshing out. God is the primary efficient cause of man's actions. Man is the secondary efficient cause of his actions. Therefore there are two efficient causes of human actions. Man's free will piggybacks on the free will of God.

It is true then that:

1. Adam ate the apple of his own free will.

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<sup>22</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles: Book 3: Part 2*, (United States: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955.), 36.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 36.

And

2. God willed that Adam eat the apple of his own free will.

God does not know this particular evil as merely a possible evil, but as an actual evil because He is the primary efficient cause of the action. It is not the case that God is the efficient cause and Adam is the instrumental cause of Adams sin. Both Adam and God are the efficient causes of Adam's eating of the apple. Adam is not the instrument of God's sinful action. Rather God is the efficient cause of Adams good free action, which results in the sin of Adam.

If there are two efficient causes of Adam's eating the apple, why is the primary efficient cause *not* responsible for the sin, while the secondary efficient cause *is* responsible for the sin? Robert C. Koons from the University of Texas, Austin, explains,

“Blame attaches to actions, and actions are characterized by intentions. Although God and Adam bear coequal responsibility for the truth of [propositions 1 and 2 above], they perform quite different actions. Adam intentionally eats a fruit; God does not eat a fruit. Adam knowingly breaks a divine command; God does not break one of his own commands. God commanded that Adam should not eat the fruit; He did not command that He should not will that Adam should eat the fruit... The biblical locus classicus for this sort of dual agency is the story of Joseph in Genesis... where Joseph says, “you intended it for evil, but God intended it for good”<sup>24</sup>

Even if it cannot be shown how it is that God and man can be the cause of free actions, it does not follow that it is a contradictory notion. Beyond that, God is required to cause free actions. God does not simply cause the existence of free will apart from the actions of free will. God's causing the acts of free will *is God's sustaining of human free will*. This is what it means for man's free will to piggyback on God's free will.

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<sup>24</sup> Robert C. Koons, “Dual Agency: A Thomistic Account of Providence and Human Freedom.” *Philosophia Christi* 4.2 (2002), 408.

It is not the case that God's free will overrides man's free will. God does not overpower or compete with man's free will. The existence of human free will depends on God's causing not just the fact of free will, but the acts of free will. That is *how* God sustains free will. If He did not do this, humans would not be free creatures. God wills sinful actions on the part of humans conditionally in order to attain the good of free will.

### **Conclusion**

In conclusion, the Molinist account of divine foreknowledge appears to have several problems that are not merely puzzling, but problematic. First, the Molinist does not have a basis in reality for the truth of counterfactual statements. The Molinist cannot simply rely on tautological counterfactual statements to support their view; they must have non-tautological counterfactual statements that have truth-value. Grounding the truth of these kinds of statements in psychological factors and surrounding circumstances is not an option for Molinists such as William Lane Craig. He must ground them in God's natural knowledge. But it is difficult to establish how God could know the truth of counterfactual statements (even if it is possible to know them) on such knowledge. Without this explanation, it is difficult to distinguish God's natural knowledge from His middle knowledge.

Second, Dr. Craig's view discusses free will in a univocal sense. Since it is clear that God's free will is only like human free will, this approach would likely lead to errors in thinking about God's will. We are not the first cause of our free will; God is. This should be taken into account when one develops one's view of divine foreknowledge. This univocal understanding can be seen when Dr. Craig bases some of God's knowledge on other knowledge. God does not think discursively.

Third, Molinism takes pride in its ability to maintain God's sovereignty and man's free will. However, as has been mentioned already, Molinism actually presupposes a kind of determinism. Even if we accept Dr. Craig's view that God's knowledge is self-contained, we are still left without a ground for God's knowledge of counterfactuals. If there is no ground, then there is no real meaningful distinction between God's natural knowledge and God's middle knowledge.

Finally, the Thomistic view accounts for man's free will, God's sovereignty, God's perfect knowledge of the future, and God's undifferentiated unity. Since common objections to this view are found to be without merit, we have good reason for holding the Thomistic view.

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